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In the recent case of New York v. Belton' the United
States Supreme Court significantly expanded the authority
of law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless searches
of automobiles and their contents in the absence of probable
cause to believe seizable items will be found. The Court
held that incident to the custodial arrest of an occupant of a
motor vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of that vehicle and any containers found therein. This
article will examine that decision and will show that the
* B.S., University of Illinois, 1968; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law,
1971; Professor of Law and Associate Dean, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
2. On the same day, July 1, 1981, that the Burger Court expanded the right of the
police to make a warrantless search of an automobile incident to the arrest of one of
its occupants, it also limited the authority of law enforcement personnel to conduct a
warrantless search under the so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. In Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion), the Court held that police officers lawfully searching an automobile upon
probable cause to believe it contained seizable items could not open a closed, opaque
container discovered during their search. See infra text accompanying notes 198-215.
Robbins, however, was effectively overruled eleven months later in United States v.
Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 219-21.
In the subsequent case of Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), the Court
further expanded the authority of the police to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles. It held that upon making a lawful investigatory stop of the occupant of
a motor vehicle, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a police officer may search those
areas of the passenger compartment in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, if
he reasonably believes that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.
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Court unnecessarily went beyond the rationale justifying a
search incident to an arrest and consequently reduced the
protection afforded individuals by the fourth amendment to
3
the United States Constitution.
I.

THE BELTON DECISION

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized
the basic principle that the fourth amendment permits the
police to conduct a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. Nevertheless, the Court has not been consistent in
defining the permissible scope of such a search. While it has
uniformly stated that theperson of the arrestee may be constitutionally searched, over the years it has vacillated as to
the permissible scope of a search of theplace where the arrest is made. For example, in one case the Court upheld a
five-hour search of the entire four-room apartment in which
the arrest occurred, 6 and in another it upheld a thorough
search of the arrestee's business office. 7 In other cases, however, the Court condemned similar widespread searches of
the place where the arrest was made.8 Finally, in the 1969
3. U. S. CON ST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
The fourth amendment, including the exclusionary rule that serves as a sanction for
its violation, is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
4. For a "most cursory review" see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-62
(1969). See also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
5. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-60 (1969).
6. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (federal agents searched all
the chest and bureau drawers, combed the contents of a linen closet, lifted carpets,
stripped the bed-linen, turned over the mattress on the bed, and even looked in the
arrestee's shoes).
7. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (one and one-half hour
search during which agents searched the arrestee's desk, safe, and file cabinets).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (search of arrestee's
business office, including search of two desks, two waste baskets and a towel cabinet);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (search of arrestee's
three-room business office, including search of desk and safe). See also Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (seizure of various items from barn-like structure
in which arrestee was operating a still).
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Chimel v. California9 decision, the Court attempted once and
for all to delineate the proper bounds of such a search.
In Chimel the police arrested the defendant in his home

for the burglary of a coin shop. Immediately following the
arrest the officers searched the defendant's entire threebedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small
workshop. During this search, which lasted almost an hour,
the police seized numerous coins, medals, and tokens, as
well as a few other items. The Supreme Court held the
search and seizures unconstitutional because the search exceeded the permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest. 10 The Court reasoned that the fourth amendment sets

forth a preference for prior judicial approval of searches and
that, although there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, the scope of any such permissible warrantless search is
limited by the justifications allowing the initiation of the
search. It concluded:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer
to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to
grab a weapon or evidentiary item must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in
front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a
search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control" - construing that phrase to mean the
area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.

9. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
10. Id. at 768. Although the police arrested Chimel pursuant to an arrest warrant, the California Supreme Court subsequently held the warrant invalid. Nevertheless, that court concluded the arrest was still lawful. People v. Chimel, 68 Cal. 2d 436,
439 P.2d 333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968), rev'd, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969). The United States Supreme Court, without deciding the issue, assumed the
arrest did not violate the Constitution. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755.
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There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs - or, for that matter, for searching through all
the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that
room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of

a search warrant."I
New York v. Belton 12 applied the Chime? "immediate
control" test to the arrest of an occupant of a motor vehicle.
In Belton, a state trooper stopped an automobile occupied by
four men for speeding on the New York Thruway. While
questioning the driver and learning that none of the occupants owned the car or was related to its owner, the officer
smelled the odor of burnt marijuana. He also saw on the
floor of the vehicle an envelope marked "Supergold," which
he recognized as a type of envelope commonly used to sell
marijuana. The officer ordered the men out of the car and
placed them under arrest for the unlawful possession of marijuana.13 After frisking each of the men and separating
them from each other,' 4 he examined the envelope and discovered it contained a small amount of marijuana. He then
searched each of the men and the passenger compartment of
the automobile. During the search of the vehicle, he seized
marijuana cigarette butts from the ashtrays and searched
five jackets he found on the back seat. Inside the zippered
pocket of the jacket belonging to Belton, the trooper discovered a small amount of cocaine.
11. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63 (footnote omitted).
12. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
13. Although the Supreme Court stated that the trooper placed the men under
arrest at this point, both the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals, People v.
Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 449, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (1980), rev'd,
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and the opinion of the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court, People v. Belton, 68 A.D.2d 198, 199, 416 N.Y.S.2d
922, 923 (1979), rev'd, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, rev'd, New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), stated the men were arrested after the policeman
examined the "Supergold" envelope and found marijuana inside it. On remand from
the United States Supreme Court the New York Court of Appeals adhered to its
original position as to when the men were placed under arrest. People v. Belton, 55
N.Y.2d 49, 51, 432 N.E.2d 745, 746, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874 (1982).
14. The Court stated that the trooper "'split them up into four separate areas of
the Thruway at this time so they would not be in physical touching area of each
other.'" Belton, 453 U.S. at 456.
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Following his indictment for criminal possession of a
controlled substance, Belton moved to suppress the cocaine
on fourth amendment grounds. His motion was denied and
he consequently pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense.
On appeal of the denial of his suppression motion the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the search
of the jacket was a valid search incident to Belton's arrest for
the possession of marijuana."
The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed. 16 It
held that "[a] warrantless search of the zippered pockets of
an unaccessible [sic] jacket may not be upheld as a search
incident to a lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate might gain access to the
article."'17 The court found that Belton "retained an expectation of privacy in the contents of his jacket pockets notwithstanding the fact of his arrest,""' because the zippered pocket
of a jacket is a private receptacle in which a person might
place his most personal items. The court reasoned that since
"[t]he car was in a secure place where it could have been
easily guarded, [and] its occupants under arrest and safely
away from the vehicle, their removal to the police station
imminent,"' 9 the jacket was "safely within the exclusive custody and control of the police." 20 It concluded that "[tihere
was, therefore, no reason why the search should not have
awaited the issuance of a warrant." 2 ' In reaching its result
15. People v. Belton, 68 A.D.2d 198, 416 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1979). The court stated
that "[o]nce defendant was validly arrested for possession of marijuana, the officer
was justified in searching the immediate area for other contraband." Id. at 201, 416
N.Y.S.2d at 925.
16. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1980).
17. Id. at 449, 407 N.E.2d at 421, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
18. Id. at 452, 407 N.E.2d at 423, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
19. Id. (footnote omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id. Two judges dissented from the holding of the court. They could find no

justification for disturbing the determination of the lower courts that "the jackets were
within reach of the four suspects and had not yet been reduced to the exclusive control of the officer," id. at 454, 407 N.E.2d at 424, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting), and the conclusion that the search was therefore incidental to a lawful
arrest. The judges stated:

We are not here faced with an extended search of a defendant's property after
the defendant has been completely subdued and all actual danger has passed.
Rather, this search was conducted by a lone peace officer who was in the pro-
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the court relied upon the Supreme Court's decisions in
UnitedStates v. Chadwick22 and Arkansas v. Sanders,23 both
of which involved a warrantless search of a piece of luggage
seized from the trunk of an automobile.
In Chadwick, federal narcotics agents, acting upon probable cause to believe a footlocker being transported by the
defendants contained marijuana, arrested the defendants immediately after they placed the footlocker in the trunk of
their automobile. At the time of the arrests, the trunk was
still open and two of the defendants were standing next to
it.24 The agents took the defendants and the footlocker to
cess of arresting four unknown individuals whom he had stopped in a speeding
car owned by none of them and apparently containing an uncertain quantity
of a controlled substance. The suspects were standing by the side of the car as
the officer gave it a quick check to confirm his suspicions before attempting to
transport them to police headquarters or radioing for assistance. The situation
was still fluid, and neither the suspects themselves nor their property had as yet
been reduced to the exclusive control of the police. ... The potential for
danger to the officer or for the destruction of evidence is patent ...
Apparently the majority believes that since the suspects were standing
outside the car at the time of the search and had been told that they were
under arrest, both their persons and their property had thereby been conclusively and safely reduced to the complete control of the officer, as a matter of
law. Although one might well wish that all criminal suspects could so readily
be subdued as a matter of law [we] cannot agree with a decision that requires a
police officer to stake his very life upon the validity of such a questionable
presumption.
Id. at 454-55, 407 N.E.2d at 424-25, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79.
The majority responded by stating, "One searches the record in vain for support
of the dissenter's claim that at the time ofthe arrest. . . 'the jackets were within reach
of the four suspects and had not yet been reduced to the exclusive control of the
officer.'" 50 N.Y.2d at 452 n.2, 407 N.E.2d at 423 n.2, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 577 n.2 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
22. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
23. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
24. Two days earlier the agents, in Boston, received information from their counterparts in San Diego concerning two of the defendants. The report stated that
Machado, who met a drug courier profile, and Leary had loaded a brown footlocker,
which was unusually heavy for its size and which was leaking talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor of marijuana, onto a train bound for Boston. The
agents observed Machado and Leary arrive on the train and claim the footlocker in
the departure area of the railroad station. While the two suspects were waiting in that
area the agents released a trained police dog who smelled the footlocker and secretly
signaled the presence of a controlled substance in it. The agents arrested Machado
and Leary, as well as Chadwick, who had joined them, immediately after Machado
and Chadwick placed the footlocker in the trunk of Chadwick's car. At the time of
the arrests, Leary was sitting in the front seat of the vehicle. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at
3-4.
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the local federal building where an hour and half after the
arrests, with the defendants securely in custody,25 they
opened the 200-pound, double-locked 26 footlocker without a
warrant and found a large quantity of marijuana. The
Supreme Court held that this warrantless search could not
be
as being incident to the arrests. After first decidingjustified
that the defendants were entitled to the protection of
the
warrant clause of the fourth amendment because they possessed a legitimate privacy interest in the contents of the
footlocker,27 the Court stated:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or
other personal property not immediately associated with
the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and
there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain
access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of
the arrest.28
The Court also rejected the government's argument that luggage, because of its mobility, should be treated in the same
way as motor vehicles, which in many circumstances can be
searched upon probable cause in the absence of a warrant.29
It reasoned that individuals have greater expectations of privacy in luggage than in an automobile, because "[u]nlike an
automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects," 30 and
that luggage can be safely immobilized more easily than an
automobile. On this latter point it concluded that "[t]he ini25. In its statement of the facts the Court noted that law enforcement officers
maintained exclusive control over the footlocker from the moment of the defendants'
arrests, that from the time the footlocker was placed in the federal building there was
no risk its contents would be removed by the defendants or their associates, and that
secure storage facilities for the footlocker were available in the building. The Court
also pointed out that there was no indication the footlocker contained inherently dangerous items or evidence which would lose its value in a short period of time. Id. at 4.
26. In addition to the regular trunk lock, the footlocker was also locked with a
padlcck. Id. at 4-5.
27. The Government had argued that the warrant clause protects only interests
traditionally identified with the home and that therefore it is not "unreasonable" to
conduct a warrantless search of personal effects lawfully seized outside the home on
probable cause. See id. at 6-7.
28. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15 (footnote omitted).
29. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
30. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
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tial seizure and detention of the footlocker. . . were suffi'3 1
cient to guard against any risk that evidence might be lost."

In Sanders, the police, acting upon probable cause to believe the defendant's suitcase contained marijuana, stopped
the taxi in which the defendant was riding and seized the
suitcase from the trunk of that vehicle.32 They immediately
opened the unlocked suitcase without a warrant and found a
large quantity of marijuana inside. The state sought to justify the warrantless search of the suitcase on the basis of the
so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement.33 The Supreme Court rejected that contention, holding that the exception does not allow the police to conduct a
warrantless search of luggage they have lawfully seized from
an automobile, even though they have probable cause to believe the luggage contains contraband.34 It stated:
A closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as
mobile as the vehicle in which it rides. But as we noted in
Chadwick, the exigency of mobility must be assessed at the
point immediately before the search - after the police
have seized the object to be searched and have it securely
within their control. . . . Once police have seized a suitcase ... the extent of its mobility is in no way affected by

the place from which it was taken. Accordingly, as a gen31. Id. The Court noted that the seizure of luggage and its indefinite immobilization constitutes a lesser interference with the rights of the owner than would an immediate warrantless search, which is not necessarily true with an automobile. Id. at 13
n.8.
32. A previously reliable informant had told the police that Sanders would arrive
at the Little Rock, Arkansas, airport on a certain flight and would be carrying a green
suitcase containing marijuana. The police observed Sanders arrive as predicted and
retrieve a green suitcase from the baggage claim area. They then saw Sanders give
the suitcase to a man who had met him upon his arrival and enter a taxi. A short
while later the officers observed the other man join Sanders in the cab, after first
placing the green suitcase in the trunk. The police officers followed the taxi and
stopped it a few blocks from the airport. Upon the request of the officers, the driver
opened the trunk of his vehicle. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 755.
33. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S.132 (1925). See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.2 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
34. The state conceded there were no special exigencies that would justify the
warrantless search of the suitcase. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763 n.l l. In addition, it did
not argue that the search was incident to the defendant's arrest, so the Court did not
consider the constitutionality of searches of luggage incident to the arrest of its possessor. Nevertheless, the Court noted that "it appears that the bag was not within [the
defendant's] 'immediate control' at the time of the search." Id. at 764 n. 11.
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eral rule there is no greater need for warrantless searches of
luggage taken from automobiles than of luggage taken
from other places.
Similarly, a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped
on the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser
expectation of privacy than is associated with luggage
taken from other locations. One is not less inclined to
place private, personal possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather
than transported by other means or temporarily checked or
stored. Indeed, the very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as
a repository for personal items when one wishes to transport them. Accordingly, the reasons for not requiring a
warrant for the search of an automobile do not apply to
searches of 35personal luggage taken by police from
automobiles.
When Belton reached the Supreme Court, however, the
Court found neither Chadwick nor Sanders relevant. It reversed the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals and
upheld the search of Belton's jacket pocket as a valid search
incident to a custodial arrest. The Court adopted a per se
rule that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile" 36 and may "examine the
contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment," 37 regardless of whether the container is opened
or closed, and even if the container "could hold neither a
weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the
35. Id. at 763-65 (footnote and citations omitted). The Court did note an exception to its rule:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a
search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some
containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases
the contents of a package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the
need for a warrant.
Id. at 764 n.13.
Sanders has since been limited by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 219-22.
36. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
37. Id.
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suspect was arrested. ' 38 It defined "container" as "any object capable of holding another object, ' 39 and stated that
"[i]t. . .includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags,
clothing, and the like.' 4
The Belton Court started with the proposition that under
its holding in Chimel a police officer, as an incident of a lawful custodial arrest, can conduct a contemporaneous warrantless search of the person arrested and the area within his
immediate control. It noted, however, that the lower court
previously had difficulty applying this principle in specific
cases and that no "straightforward rule" defining "the
proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile in4t
cident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants"
emerged from the decided cases. This, the Court strongly
implied, resulted in a dilution of the protection of the fourth
amendment because that protection" 'can only be realized if
the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, make it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in
the interest of law enforcement.' "42 To remedy this situation the Court adopted the per se rule set forth above. It
justified that portion of the rule allowing the search of the
passenger compartment on the ground that its "reading of
the cases [suggested] the generalization that articles inside
the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment
of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably,
within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].' "43 It then reasoned
that "if the passenger compartment is within reach of the
arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach,"'
38. Id. at 461.
39. Id. at 460 n.4.
40. Id.

41. Id. at 459.
42. Id. at 458 (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures . The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 142).

43. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969)).
44. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (footnote omitted).
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and pointed out that in United States v. Robinson 45 it had
rejected the argument that a container found on the person
of an arrestee could not be searched as an incident of the
arrest if it could not contain a weapon or evidence of the
crime for which the person was arrested.46
45. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
46. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461. In Robinson a police officer effected a custodial arrest
of the defendant for both driving after the revocation of his driver's license and obtaining a license by misrepresentation. In accordance with police department procedures the officer then searched the arrestee, taking a "crumpled up cigarette package"
from a pocket of his coat. The officer opened the pack and found and seized 14
gelatin capsules of white powder, which proved to be heroin. Robinson, 414 U.S. at
220-23. The Supreme Court upheld the search as one incident to a lawful custodial
arrest. Id. at 236. It rejected the court of appeals' theory that the principles of Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which authorized a "frisk" incident to an investigative stop
based on less than probable cause to arrest, allowed the arresting officer to conduct
only a limited patdown of the arrestee's outer clothing and to remove any weapons he
might, as a result of the patdown, have reasonably believed the person possessed.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 227-29. Instead, the Court adopted a per se rule allowing the
police to conduct a full search of the person of an arrestee when they have made a
custodial arrest. Id. at 233-35. In doing so, it stated:
The Court of Appeals in effect determined that the only reason supporting
the authority for afull search incident to lawful arrest was the possibility of
discovery of evidence or fruits. Concluding that there could be no evidence or
fruits in the case of an offense such as that with which respondent was charged,
it held that any protective search would have to be limited by the conditions
laid down in Terry for a search upon less than probable cause to arrest. Quite
apart from the fact that Terry clearly recognized the distinction between the
two types of searches, and that a different rule governed one than governed the
other, we find additional reason to disagree with the Court of Appeals.
The justification or reason for the authority to search incident to a lawful
arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take
him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person for
later use at trial. The standards traditionally governing a search incident to
lawful arrest are not, therefore, commuted to the stricter Terry standards by
the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the particular crime for
which the arrest is made.
Nor are we inclined, on the basis of what seems to us to be a rather speculative judgment, to qualify the breadth of the general authority to search incident to a lawful custodial arrest on an assumption that persons arrested for the
offense of driving while their licenses have been revoked are less likely to possess dangerous weapons than are those arrested for other crimes. It is scarcely
open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far greater in the case of the
extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting
contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop. This is an adequate basis
for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification.
But quite apart form these distinctions, our more fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion that there must be
litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of the
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The Court distinguished Chadwick and Sanders on the
ground that "neither of those cases involved an arguably
valid search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. 47 It also
rejected the New York Court of Appeals' theory that the
search of Belton's jacket could not have been incident to his
arrest because by the trooper's very act of searching the jacket and seizing its contents he had gained "exclusive control"
over them. 48 The Court stated that "under this fallacious theory no search or seizure incident to a lawful custodial arrest
would ever be valid; by seizing an article even on the arrestee's person, an officer may be said to have reduced that article to his 'exclusive control.' "49
reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful
arrest. We do not think the long line of authorities of this court. . . or what
we can glean from the history of practice in this country and in England, requires such a case-by-case adjudication. A police officer's determination as to
how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is
necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not
require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the
search. The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person
of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the
fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold
that in the case of lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only
an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also
a "reasonable" search under that Amendment.
Id. at 233-35 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
47. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461-62. The Court pointed out that in Chadwick the
search occurred long after the defendants were arrested and securely in custody and
long after the footlocker was in the exclusive control of the federal agents, and that in
Sanders the Court expressly stated it had not considered the search incident to arrest
rationale because the state did not raise that argument and it appeared that the suitcase, which was in the trunk of the taxi, was not within the defendants' "immediate
control" at the time of the search. Id. at 462.
48. A reading of the Belton New York Court of Appeals decision clearly indicates the Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted that court's rationale. See supra text
accompanying notes 17-21.
49. 453 U.S. at 462 n.5.
Justice Rehnquist wrote a brief concurring opinion in which he stated that he
joined the opinion of the Court because it was apparent that a majority of the Court
was unwilling to overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which held the exclusionary rule applicable to state criminal proceedings, and because the Court found it
unnecessary to consider the applicability of the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement. Belton, 453 U.S. at 463 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
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The Court's opinion in Belton is, however, open to criticism on several grounds. First, the reasoning used by the

Court to support its decision to reject a case-by-case analysis
in favor of a per se rule is unsound; it is based upon invalid
conclusions and will therefore often lead to results that are

inconsistent with the underlying rationale for allowing a
warrantless search incident to an arrest. Second, the rule is

subject to abuse by the police. Finally, the rationale used by
the Court applies equally to non-automobile situations and
hence could lead to general emasculation of the Chimel "im-

mediate control" principle.
II.

BELTON'S PER SE APPROACH

The basic criticism that can be leveled at New York v.
Belton5 o is that it eliminated the requirement that the validity of a passenger compartment search of an automobile as
an incident of the lawful custodial arrest of that vehicle's occupant be determined on a case-by-case basis under the
concurred in the judgment of the Court, but, as he explained in his dissenting opinion
in the companion case of Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion), he did so because he concluded the "automobile exception" justified the search.
He expressly rejected the per se rule adopted by the Court in Belton, because he felt it
is unreasonable for police officers who have apprehended a person for a minor traffic
offense to conduct a warrantless search of the interior of the vehicle being driven by
that person, and any containers found therein, when they lack probable cause to believe contraband will be found. Robbins, 435 U.S. at 451-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See infra text accompanying notes 172-73. Justice Brennan and Justice White, both
of whom were joined by Justice Marshall, wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Brennan
asserted that by adopting the fiction that "the interior of a car is always within the
immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car," Belton, 453 U.S.
at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original), the majority opinion failed to
take into account the underlying rationale articulated in Chime? for allowing a warrantless search incident to an arrest, namely, to protect the arresting officer by
preventing the arrestee from gaining access to a weapon and to prevent the arrestee
from concealing or destroying evidence. Id. at 468. He also felt that the Court's
adoption of the per se rule failed to achieve the asserted goal of providing guidance to
police officers in the field because the Court not only left open many questions concerning the factual settings in which the per se rule applies and the permissible scope
of a search under the rule, but also because the rule, in abandoning the justifications
underlying Chimel, offers no guidance to the police officer seeking to work out the
answers to these questions for himself. Id. at 469-71. See infra text accompanying
notes 121 & 183. Justice White concluded that as to luggage, briefcases, and other
containers, the Court's per se rule was an "extreme extension" of the holding in
Chime? and one to which he could not subscribe. Belton, 453 U.S. at 472 (White, J.,
dissenting).
50. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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principles enunciated in Chimel v. California.51 As a substitute for the Chimel analysis the Court adopted a rule expressed in terms of a "standardized procedure" which the
police can apply in every case involving the custodial arrest
of the occupant of an automobile, regardless of the facts of
the particular case. The Court believed that in order to realize the protections of the fourth amendment it is essential
that police officers in the field be armed with a straightforward set of rules they can easily understand and apply.
Quoting an article by Professor LaFave, it explained:
"Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by
the exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the
police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be
expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police
in the context of the law enforcement activities in which
they are necessarily engaged. A highly sophisticated set of
rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile
minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be
'literally impossible of application by the officer in the
field.' "52
The Court concluded that since the lower court cases applying the Chimel "immediate control' test in the context of a
search of the interior of a motor vehicle incident to the custodial arrest of its occupant reached inconsistent results, no
straightforward set of rules had emerged and therefore it
needed to adopt a clearer, more easily applied rule.
While the Court's initial premise may be accepted as a
general principle, the Belton Court did not satisfactorily explain why this particular area of search and seizure law requires a rule expressed in terms of a "standardized
procedure." The Court certainly could not have been suggesting that all areas of search and seizure law should be
governed by per se rules that do not call for interpretation by
law enforcement personnel in the field. It is often difficult,
for example, for a police officer to determine whether a par51. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
52. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting LaFave, supra note 42, at 141 (quoting
United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting))).
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ticular third person can effectively consent to a search of a
suspect's premises or effects; 53 yet the Court has held that it
must be decided under the facts and circumstances of each
case whether the person had "common authority over or

other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought

to be inspected. ' 54 Similarly, it is difficult for a police officer
to determine whether his contemplated use of binoculars or
a telescope to peer into the window of a home or place of
business would constitute a "search" within the meaning of

the fourth amendment; 55 yet it is inconceivable that the
Court would not hold that this issue must be determined on
a case-by-case basis under the "justifiable expectation of privacy" test of Katz v. United States. 56 In each of these situations it no doubt would be easier for police officers in the
field if there were a per se rule that would clearly tell them
whether effective consent to search could be given or
whether the use of binoculars or a telescope would constitute
a "search." Nevertheless, the Court has never suggested that
these situations should be governed by per se rules,57 despite
seemingly inconsistent lower court decisions in cases involv-

53. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 33, at §§ 8.1-.6.
54. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (footnote omitted). In
Matlock the Court explained that "common authority" rests "on mutual use of the
property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. .. "
Id. at 171 n.7. As to the effect of a reasonable but mistaken belief by police officers
that a third party has "common authority" over the place searched, see 2 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 33, at § 8.3(g).
55. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 33, at § 8.3(g).
56. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 33, at § 2.1.
57. Although the Supreme Court has on at least two occasions stated that the use
of binoculars to observe a distant object is not a search, see On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927), these comments were dicta and, more importantly, were made in cases decided prior to the
Courtfs landmark decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which drastically altered the analysis for determining whether governmental conduct constitutes a
search for fourth amendment purposes.
In the recent case of United States v. Knotts, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (1983), the Court
upheld the government's use of an electronic tracking device, or beeper, to locate the
site of an illegal drug laboratory, stating that the fourth amendment does not prohibit
the police from using devices to enhance their sensory faculties. The Court was careful to point out, however, that "there is no indication that the beeper was used in any
way to reveal information as to the movement of the drum [in which it had been
placed] within the cabin [being used as the laboratory], or in any way that would not
have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin." Id. at 1087.
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ing similar facts. 8
What is it then that makes an area of fourth amendment
law ripe for the adoption of a "standardized procedure"?
Professor LaFave has offered some guidance. In a subsequent portion of the article quoted by the Belton Court, he
made it clear he was not urging a wholesale adoption of per
se rules, but rather was merely suggesting that "certain
search and seizure rules [be] expressed in terms of 'standardized procedures' or a 'set routine' . . . .59 He asserted that
"[s]uch an approach seems particularly appropriate for those
forms of police action which involve relatively minor intrusions into privacy, occur with great frequency, and virtually
defy on-the-spot rationalization on the basis of the unique
facts of the individual case."6°
LaFave's test seems to be an appropriate one. By limiting "standardized procedures" to frequently occurring situations in which police officers would otherwise virtually be
guessing whether their contemplated conduct was constitutional, it assures that the "standardized procedure" will
achieve the goal of realizing the protections of the fourth
amendment by clearly telling the police what conduct is impermissible, thereby decreasing significantly the number of
occasions in which the police inadvertently violate an individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Furthermore, since the test requires that the police
conduct involve a relatively minor intrusion into privacy, it
58. E.g., compare People v. Elders, 63 Ill. App. 3d 554, 380 N.E.2d 10 (1978) (no
valid consent), with Meyer v. State, 43 Md. App. 427, 406 A.2d 427 (1979) (co-owner's
consent is valid), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980), and State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St. 2d
155, 400 N.E.2d 375 (1980) (valid consent) (Cases dealing with the effectiveness of a
spouse's consent for law enforcement officers to search a suspect's car). Comparealso
United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980) (some were searches), and
United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976) (telescopic surveillance
was a search), and Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 431 A.2d 964 (1981), with
People v. Hicks, 49 Ill. App. 3d 421, 364 N.E.2d 440 (1977) (use of binoculars was not
a search), and People v. Ferguson, 47 Ill. App. 3d 654, 365 N.E.2d 77 (1977) (use of
binoculars was not a search), and State v. Thompson, 196 Neb. 55, 241 N.W.2d 511
(1976) (search was not unlawful), and Commonwealth v. Hemley, 216 Pa. Super. 177,
263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971) (Cases dealing with the lawfulness of a "search" conducted by law enforcement officers in which they utilize visual
aids to enhance visibility).
59. LaFave, supra note 42, at 142 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 142-43.
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assures that in those cases in which the standardized procedure leads to the theoretically "wrong" result, the harm will
be minimal.
When applied to the search of an automobile incident to
the custodial arrest of an occupant of that vehicle, however,
Professor LaFave's test leads to the conclusion that this area
of search and seizure law is not one that calls for a rule expressed in terms of a "standardized procedure." Even
though custodial arrests of occupants of motor vehicles occur quite frequently, the intrusion into privacy is not "relatively minor." Professor LaFave articulated his test in an
article 6' discussing the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Robinson,62 in which the Court adopted a per se
rule allowing the full search of a person under arrest. He
concluded that such a search is a relatively minor intrusion,
given the fact that by definition there will be a much more
serious intrusion into the privacy of the person, namely, the
"'future interference with the individual's freedom of movement' "63 caused by his custodial arrest. The search of a motor vehicle, however, is unrelated to and goes beyond any
interference with the arrestee's person. And while
automobiles have never been accorded the same deference
as homes or offices, 64 the Supreme Court has made it clear
that "automobiles are 'effects' under the Fourth Amendment ' 65 and that "[the word 'automobile' is not a talisman
in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and
disappears. 66 Indeed, the Court has stated that a search of
61. See generally id.
62. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). See supra note 46.
63. LaFave, supra note 42, at 144 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
64. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976); Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589-91 (1974) (plurality opinion); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 48 (1970).
65. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977). See also South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
66. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463-64 (1971). See also Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion), in which Justice Blackmun wrote:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function
is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of
personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view. . . .This is not to say that no part of the interior of an automobile has
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an automobile "is a substantial invasion of privacy. ' 67 Thus,
the mere fact that the more serious step of an arrest has been
taken should not lead to the conclusion that an incidental
search of the motor vehicle which the arrestee occupied prior
to his arrest
is only a relatively minor intrusion into his
68

privacy.

Even if such a conclusion could be reached, this is not
the type of situation that "virtually deflies] on-the-spot rationalization on the basis of the unique facts of the individual case. 69 Professor LaFave agreed with the per se rule
adopted in Robinson primarily because of the difficulty a police officer would have in determining whether he had probable cause to believe an arrestee was carrying evidence of a
crime on his person at the time of his arrest. Such a decision, he reasoned, "would require the officer largely to speculate about what might exist which could be characterized as
evidence of the crime and, in many cases, what likelihood
exists that those items are still in the possession of the arrestee."' 70 In contrast, when a police officer arrests the occupant
of a motor vehicle and desires to search the vehicle, and perhaps also its contents, under Chimel he need only determine
whether the particular area of the vehicle and the items located in that area are within the arrestee'simmediate control,
"construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.1 71 This is merely a particularlized version of the decision an officer must make whenever he arrests an
individual and wishes to search beyond the arrestee's person,
and it is not nearly as difficult a question to answer as that
Fourth Amendment protection; the exercise of a desire to be mobile does not,
of course, waive one's right to be free of unreasonable government intrusion.
Id. at 590-91 (citation omitted).
67. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975) (footnote omitted).
68. Cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391 (1978) ("It is one thing to say that
one who is legally taken into police custody has a lessened right of privacy in his
person. . . . It is quite another to argue that he also has a lessened right of privacy
in his entire house." (citations omitted)); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
456-57 (1971) (even under pre-Chimel law the contemporaneous search of an arrestee's car could not be justified as one incident to an arrest when the arrest took place
inside the arrestee's house and the car was parked in the driveway next to the house).
69. LaFave, supra note 42, at 142-43.
70. Id. at 143 (footnote omitted).
71. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (footnote omitted).
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which would be raised in a Robinson-type situation in the
absence of a per se rule. The police officer can base his decision upon objective factors that are readily available to him
at the time of the arrest. In each particular case he can consider factors such as the distance between the arrestee and
the automobile, the apparent ease or difficulty with which
the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle, the relative
number of police officers and arrestees, and the position of
the arresting officers in relation to the arrestee and the car. z

This is not, then, the type of situation that fits within Professor LaFave's suggested guidelines for the adoption of a
"standardized procedure."
The mere fact that lower courts had reached inconsistent
results in determining when an automobile and its contents
were within the "immediate control" of an arrestee who was
a recent occupant of that vehicle does not call for a different

conclusion. In numerous areas of the law the Court in the
past has set forth a new rule which, because of the somewhat
general terms in which it was stated, has been interpreted
and applied in different ways by different lower courts.73
This is to be expected, for "[i]t is certainly asking too much
to expect that the basic standard which is to serve as the
72. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally 2 W.
supra note 33, § 7.1(b), at 502-03.
73. For example, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court held
that federal agents conducted a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment when they overheard and recorded the defendant's end of a telephone conversation by means of an electronic eavesdropping device which the agents attached to the
exterior of a public telephone booth used by the defendant. In reaching this result the
Court concluded that the Government's activities "violated the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth .. " Id. at 353. When applying this "justifiable expectation of privacy" test to other types of police conduct the
lower courts did not always reach consistent results. Compare, e.g., United States v.
Emery, 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976) (insertion of electronic beeper into package containing contraband and subsequent monitoring to determine when package was
opened did not invade defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy), and United
States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.) (insertion of electronic beeper into drums
containing non-contraband substance and subsequent monitoring of defendant's
movements on public roads did not invade defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976), with United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106
(1st Cir. 1977) (monitoring of electronic beepers placed into box containing non-contraband chemicals and upon defendants' van invaded defendants' reasonable expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978), and United States v. Holmes, 521
F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975) (installation of electronic beeper on defendant's van and
subsequent monitoring of defendant's movements on public roads invaded defendLAFAVE,
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starting point for analysis should from its inception provide
a ready answer for every conceivable fact situation." 74 In
these other areas, however, the Court has often helped to
resolve these inconsistencies by further refining or explaining the test and applying it to concrete fact situations in subsequent cases, thereby providing more guidance to the lower
7
courtsY.
There is no reason why this could not have been
done in the situation involving the permissible scope of a
ant's reasonable expectation of privacy), ag'dpercuriam, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976)
(en banc).
Similarly, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court set forth procedural guidelines for law enforcement personnel to follow before and during custodial
interrogation of a suspect. In the years following Miranda the lower courts had difficulty determining, for example, what constitutes "interrogation." Compare, e.g.,
Combs v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 82 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (showing the defendant incriminating ballistics report is not "interrogation"), and State v. Burnett, 429
S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1968) (confronting defendant with stolen money is not "interrogation"), and Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d 361 (1970) (statement
to defendant that police do not need a statement from him because witnesses had
already identified him, but that they would like to hear his side of the story, is not
"interrogation"), with Combs v. Wingo, 465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972) (showing the
defendant incriminating ballistics report is "interrogation"), and Commonwealth v.
Leaming, 432 Pa. 326, 247 A.2d 590 (1968) (statement to defendant that if he wished
to make a statement he should do so now because he was liable to end up a "patsy,"
since his alleged accomplice had been arrested and was likely to talk, is
"interrogation").
74. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 9.3(a), at 59.
Professor Amsterdam helped place this problem in perspective when he stated:
The Supreme Court ordinarily must decide the case before it. It must do so
even though it is not prepared to announce the new principle in terms of comparable generality with the old, still less to say how much the old must be
displaced and whether or how the old and new can be accommodated. If the
Court declines to give birth to the new principle, it will never acquire the experience or the insight to answer these latter questions. If it attempts to answer
them at the moment of the new principle's birth, it is not likely to answer them
wisely. Clarity and consistency are desirable, certainly, to the extent that they
can be achieved. But the temptation to achieve them by ignoring the complex
and the unpredictable quality of real problems is fortunately less beguiling to
Justices perenially faced with responsibility for solving those problems than to
the Justices' academic critics.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 352
(1974).
75. For example, in United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983), the Court
applied the Katz "justifiable expectation of privacy" test to determine whether the
placement of an electronic beeper in a drum containing a noncontraband chemical
and the subsequent tracking of the purchaser's movements on public roads constitute
a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See supra note 57. And in
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the Court explained what constitutes "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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search incident to the arrest of the occupant of an
automobile.
Indeed, an examination of the cases cited by the Belton
Court as examples of the inconsistent results being reached
by the lower courts 76 clearly reveals that the Court could
have resolved much of the confusion without taking the "giant step" 77 of adopting a per se rule. These cases do support
the Supreme Court's conclusion that there was confusion
among the lower courts concerning the proper application of
Chimel in the context of the search of the interior of an automobile and its contents. Nevertheless, these cases also
demonstrate that the confusion concerned several specific issues, namely, (1) whether the search of a particular type of
container found within the arrestee's vehicle was a search of
the person of the arrestee and therefore subject to the per se
rule set forth in United States v. Robinson78 or whether, instead, it was a search of the area surrounding the arrestee
and therefore subject to the Chimel "immediate control"
test; (2) whether the time when the person was arrested, or,
rather, the time when the search took place, was the relevant
time at which the place searched must have been within the
arrestee's immediate control; (3) whether the mobility of the
vehicle and of any items in it was a relevant consideration in
determining whether a search of that vehicle or its contents
could be undertaken as an incident of the arrest; (4) whether
the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Chadwick79 and Arkansas v. Sanders80 had any effect on the
search incident to the arrest rule of Chimel; and (5) what
factors were important in determining whether the automo76. The Supreme Court cited the following cases: United States v. Benson, 631
F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); United States v. Sanders, 631
F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); United States v. Rigales,
630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974); Hinkel v. Anchorage, 618 P.2d 1069 (Alaska
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1032 (1981); Ulesky v. State, 379 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979). Belton, 453 U.S. at 459 & n.l.
77. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 452 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). See supra note 46.
79. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See supra text and accompanying notes 24-31.
80. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). See supra text and accompanying notes 32-35.
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bile and its contents were within the arrestee's immediate
control at the relevant time.
In both Hinkel v. Anchorage8 l and Ulesky v. State,82 for
example, the police arrested the defendant while she was sitting alone in her motor vehicle, placed her in a squad car,
and then retrieved her purse from the driver's area of her
vehicle and searched it, finding contraband.8 3 A bare majority of the Hinkel court upheld the search of the purse as one
incident to a lawful custodial arrest. The Alaska Supreme
Court reasoned that a purse is property "immediately associated with the person" 84 of the arrestee, since it is frequently
worn on the person and usually serves the same function as
clothing pockets, and therefore, under the Supreme Court's
decision in Chadwick, the search was governed by the Robinson rule that allows a full search of the arrestee's person incident to his arrest, rather than the rule limiting the search of
an arrestee to that area within his imthe area surrounding
85
mediate control.
A unanimous Florida District Court of Appeals, however, held that the search of the purse in Ulesky was not
incident to the defendant's arrest. It treated the search as
one of the area surrounding the arrestee - hence subjecting
the search to the Chimel "immediate control" test - and
concluded that once the police placed the defendant in the
squad car, her purse was no longer within her immediate
control. It expressly stated that under Chimel a search incident to an arrest is "limited to the area within the immediate
control of the arrestee at the time of the search, not at the time
of the arrest. 86
88
United States v. Frick8 7 and United States v. Benson
were two other cases which, despite similar facts, reached
81. 618 P.2d 1069 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1032 (1981).

82. 379 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
83. In Hinkel the police officer found a gun, while in Ulesky he found marijuana.

84. 618 P.2d at 1071.
85. Id. at 1072. The dissenting judges felt that since the defendant had already

been placed in a squad car, the front seat of her car was not within her immediate
control at the time of the search. They then relied upon Chadwick and Sanders to
conclude that the police needed a warrant to search the defendant's purse. Id. at
1073-76 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
86. Ulesky, 379 So. 2d at 126 (emphasis added).
87. 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974).
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contradictory results. In both of those cases law enforcement
personnel searched a container - a briefcase in Frick and a
tote bag in Benson - immediately after seizing it from the
interior of the arrestee's car while the arrestee stood next to
his vehicle.89 In Frick, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
over the strong dissent of Judge Goldberg, 9° held that the
search was a valid search incident to the defendant's arrest,
since both the automobile and the briefcase were readily accessible to him while the F.B.I. agents were effecting the arrest. The court also stressed the mobility of the automobile
and the briefcase, thereby seeming to inject into its analysis
the so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement. 9' The Benson court, however, reached an opposite resuit. In a two-to-one decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the search could not be justified as one
incident to the defendant's arrest because at the time of the
search the police had already seized the tote bag and had it
within their exclusive control. The court relied upon the
Supreme Court's decisions in Chadwick and Sanders, both
of which were decided after Frick. The court focused particularly on the Chadwick Court's language that once the police
have obtained exclusive control over luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of
the arrestee, they are required to secure a warrant before
conducting a search of the item seized. 92 Judge Gibson, in
dissent, chastised the majority for applying Chadwick and
Sanders in this case. He contended that the language from
those cases relied upon by the majority applied only to cases
in which the container seized was beyond the immediate
88. 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 453 U.S. 918 (1981) (remanded for

consideration in light of Belton).
89. For facts of Frick see infra text accompanying note 93. In Benson four police
officers arrested the defendant while he was sitting in the front passenger seat of a
four-door compact station wagon. As the defendant was about to be removed from
the vehicle he turned slightly sideways and moved his arm to the top of the front seat.
He was then physically taken from the car and placed in a search position with his
hands on top of the automobile. As this was going on, another officer opened the
back door of the car on the passenger side and seized a tote bag from the rear seat.
He searched the tote bag and found a drawskin bag which contained cocaine. Benson, 631 F.2d at 1337-38.
90. See infra text accompanying note 95.

91. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
92. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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control of the arrestee at the time of his arrest. According to
Judge Gibson, any container within the arrestee's immediate
control at the time of his arrest could be searched immediately without a warrant, even though the police obtained exclusive control of the item upon seizing it.
The two opinions in United States v. Frick93 also illustrate the confusion that existed concerning the factors relevant in determining whether a certain area was within an
arrestee's immediate control. In Frick, five F.B.I. agents arrested the defendant for fraud just as he was about to enter
his automobile. As the agents were handcuffing the defendant, who was then standing within one and one-half to two
feet from his vehicle, one of them spotted a briefcase on the
floor of the rear seat of the car. The agent seized the briefcase, opened it, and found incriminating evidence. In holding that the back seat of the automobile and the briefcase
were within the defendant's immediate control, the majority
deemed it irrelevant that the door to the car might have been
closed.94 In addition, they gave no consideration to the fact
that there were five F.B.I. agents arresting a lone individual;
nor did they even mention that the agents handcuffed the
defendant during the course of the arrest. Judge Goldberg,
however, believed all these factors were significant. In his
opinion dissenting from this part of the majority's holding,
he stated:
At the time of the search in question here the defendant
Frick was in the custody of five federal agents; he either
had been, or was in the process of being, handcuffed; and
he stood in an open parking lot between one and one-half
and two feet away from his automobile. On the basis of
these facts my brothers in the majority conclude that a
search of the briefcase was justified out of a reasonable fear
that Frick might gain access to its contents and either turn
a weapon on the agents or dispose of evidence. However,
the opinion is understandably devoid of any indication of
the manner in which Frick, an individual with no previous
record for recklessness or violence, might have accompushed the rather extraordinary feats of overpowering his

93. 490 F.2d 666, 666 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974).
94. Id. at 669.
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trained captors, breaking his bonds, and destroying crucial
evidence.
By any reasonable interpretation, the area within
Frick's control at the time of this search amounted to no
more than his own person, under the most generous constructions of Chimel. While it must be admitted that had
Frick been possessed of the skill of Houdini and the
strength of Hercules, he might conceivably have reached
the contents of the briefcase, neither the panel majority nor
the court below placed him in such legendary company.
The possibility of legerdemain cannot create the justification for a warrantless search, at least under my reading of
Supreme Court decisions in this area.95 I do not believe my
vision distorted or my view myopic.
Although some of the confusion illustrated by these cases
was perhaps unwarranted, the Supreme Court had before it
in Belton a case in which it could have addressed several of
the questions causing the confusion. Without suggesting
how the Court should have answered these questions, it can
be said that instead of adopting a per se rule the Court could
have applied the Chimel test to determine whether, under
the particular facts in Belton, the passenger compartment
and the zippered pocket of the defendant's jacket, which lay
on the back seat of the car, were within the "immediate control" of the arrestees at the relevant time. By deciding this
question and articulating the reasons for its result, the Court
would have given the lower courts a better idea of how the
Chimel test should apply in the context of the arrest of the
occupant of an automobile and would therefore have helped
to establish the "straightforward rule" it deemed necessary.
This approach would have allowed the lower courts to decide each particular case on its unique facts, in light of the
underlying rationale justifying a warrantless search incident
to an arrest. It would not, of course, have assured that every
lower court would reach the theoretically correct result in
every future case, but it most likely would have resolved a
good deal of the then-existing confusion. Furthermore, the
Court could always have refined its test in subsequent cases,
thereby providing even more guidance to the lower courts
and ultimately to police officers in the field.
95. Id. at 673 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION

In addition to being an inappropriate area of search and
seizure law for a per se rule, the particular rule adopted by
the Court in New York v. Belton 96 is based upon invalid conclusions and will therefore frequently lead to results that
are inconsistent with the underlying rationale of Chimel v.
California.7 Before showing this, however, it will be helpful
to first ascertain the precise scope of the Belton Court's
holding.
A.

Scope of the Decision

In Belton, the Supreme Court held that incident to the
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the
police can search the passenger compartment of that vehicle
and any containers found therein, whether open or closed. 98
The Court based this holding on the conclusion it reached
from its reading of lower court cases, namely, that articles
inside the passenger compartment of an automobile are
"generally" within reach of such an arrestee, and its reasoning that if this is true, then any containers in the passenger
compartment will also be within his reach. 99 Given the facts
of the search upheld in Belton, °0that case must be read, at a
minimum, to allow the police, upon making the arrest, to
search any area in the passenger compartment, and any unlocked container located therein, that could readily be
reached by someone with access to the interior of the vehicle,
even though the particular arrestee is not inside the vehicle,
but merely standing near it, at the time of the search. This
reading allows the police to search the front 0 1 and rear
96. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
97. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
98. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61.
99. Id. at 460.
100. At the time the state trooper searched the zipped pocket of Belton's jacket,
which he had found on the rear seat of the car, the arrestees were standing on the
highway near the vehicle. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 456 (1981); see supra
note 14 and accompanying text.
101. See United States v. McGlynn, 671 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1982); State v. Drott,
412 So. 2d 984 (La. 1982); Gee v. State, 291 Md. 663, 435 A.2d 1387 (1981); State v.
Kearney, 183 N.J. Super. 13, 443 A.2d 214 (1981), cert. denied, 87 N.J. 449, 446 A.2d
169 (1982); State v. Todd, 56 N.C. App. 116, 286 S.E.2d 849, cert. denied, 305 N.C.

591, 292 S.E.2d 573 (1982); Russell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982);
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seats 0 2 and floor, 10 3 the area on top of and underneath the
dashboard, and the ledge beneath the rear window. It also
permits them to search any open containers and any closed
containers that could be opened with a minimum of effort,
such as a zippered jacket pocket, t 4 a satchel, 0 5 a purse 10 6 or
wallet, 10 7 an unlocked suitcase or briefcase, 10 8 a dufflebag, a
paper bag, 10 9 an ashtray," 0 and an unlocked glove compartment"' or console.
Gauldin v. State, 632 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), applicationforwrit oferror
granted; State v. Boswell, 294 S.E.2d 287 (W. Va. 1982).
102. See United States v. Enriquez, 675 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Collins, 668 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); State v. Foote, 631 S.W.2d 470
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).
103. See Thomas v. State, 415 So. 2d 1246 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (under floormat); People v. Frank, 129 Cal. App. 3d 80, 180 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1982); People v.
Robles, 125 Cal. App. 3d 887, 178 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1981); People v. Clemmons, 123
Cal. App. 3d 365, 176 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981); State v. Gullett, 418 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Conrad v. State, 160 Ga. App. 909, 288 S.E.2d 618 (1982); Fyock v.
State, 436 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. 1982); State v. Croft, 6 Kan. App. 2d 821, 635 P.2d 972
(1981) (under floormat); State v. Rice, 327 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1982); State v. Foote,
631 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); State ex rel. K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah
1981) (per curiam).
104. Belton, 453 U.S. 454. A fortiori the police can search the pockets of an item
of clothing when they are not zipped shut. People v. Clemmons, 123 Cal. App. 3d
365, 176 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981) (smock); State v. Kearney, 183 N.J. Super. 13, 443 A.2d
214 (1981) (jacket), cert. denied, 87 N.J. 449, 446 A.2d 169 (1982); State v. Todd, 56
N.C. App. 116, 286 S.E.2d 849 (jacket), cert. denied, 305 N.C. 591, 292 S.E.2d 573
(1982); State v. Foote, 631 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (jacket). See also
Fyock v. State, 436 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. 1982) (sweat sock).
105. See People v. Frank, 129 Cal. App. 3d 80, 180 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1982); State v.
Brock, 426 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). See also State v. Boswell, 294
S.E.2d 287 (W. Va. 1982) (zippered pouch).
106. See People v. Clemmons, 123 Cal. App. 3d 365, 176 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981).
107. See Gee v. State, 291 Md. 663, 435 A.2d 1387 (1981).
108. See State v. Evans, 181 N.J. Super. 455, 438 A.2d 340 (1981); Campbell v.
State, 644 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Winston, 295 S.E.2d 46 (W.
Va. 1982). See also United States v. Enriquez, 675 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1982) (lunch
pail); Thomas v. State, 415 So. 2d 1246 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (band instrument
cases); State v. Foote, 631 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (metal box).
109. See United States v. Collins, 668 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Hill
v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d 284, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 180 (1982); State v.
Gullett, 418 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Conrad v. State, 160 Ga. App. 909,
288 S.E.2d 618 (1982). See also State v. Cannon, 634 S.W.2d 648 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1982) (garbage sack).
110. See People v. Loftus, I11 Il. App. 3d 978, 444 N.E.2d 834 (1983); Russell v.
State, 644 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
111. State v. Johnson, 414 So. 2d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Loftus,
111I. App. 3d 978, 444 N.E.2d 834 (1983); Gauldin v. State, 632 S.W.2d 652 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1982), applicationforwrit of errorgranted.
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How broad is the Belton rule? Justice Brennan, in his

dissenting opinion, concluded that the majority's rule allows
the police to search the vehicle even if the arrestee has already been handcuffed and placed in a squad car. 1 2 This
interpretation of Belton appears to be correct. The broad
language used by the Court in enunciating its holding in Belton makes no mention of the actual ability of the arrestee to
break loose from the police and gain access to the interior of
the vehicle. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the arresting officer had sufficient control over
Belton and his companions at the time of the search so that
there was no longer any danger that any of them could gain
3
access to the jackets on the rear seat of the automobile. " It
would therefore seem irrelevant under Belton whether the
passenger compartment of the vehicle was made inaccessible
through other means, such as by handcuffing the arrestee, or
by placing him in a patrol car, or both. The purpose behind
the per se rule of Belton also supports this conclusion. The
Court adopted a blanket rule in order to eliminate the need
for the arresting officer to make a factual determination of
the possibility of the arrestee gaining access to the interior of
the automobile and its contents. This goal would not be
achieved if law enforcement personnel had to evaluate the

accessibility of the passenger compartment and its contents
in each individual case." 14

112. Belton, 453 U.S. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 449, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421, 429 N.Y.S.2d
574, 575 (1980).
114. The lower courts have interpreted Belton in this way. See United States v.
Collins, 668 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (arrestee and passenger handcuffed); V.I. v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1981) (arrestee handcuffed); Baxter v.
State, 274 Ark. 539, 626 S.W.2d 935 (arrestee in police car), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118
(1982); People v. Henry, - Colo. _, 631 P.2d 1122 (1981) (en banc) (arrestee handcuffed and in police vehicle); State v. Brock, 426 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (arrestee in police car); State v. Valdes, 423 So. 2d 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(arrestee in police cruiser); Chapas v. State, 404 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(arrestee in police vehicle); State v. Hopkins, 163 Ga. App. 141, 293 S.E.2d 529 (1982)
(arrestee handcuffed and in patrol car); State v. Holden, 162 Ga. App. 33, 290 S.E.2d
130 (1982) (arrestee in patrol car); People v. Loftus, 111 111. App. 3d 978, 444 N.E.2d
834 (1983) (arrestee handcuffed and in squad car with an officer guarding him); Fyock
v. State, 436 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. 1982) (arrestee handcuffed); State v. Sanders, 312
N.W.2d 534 (Iowa 1981) (arrestee handcuffed); Horton v. State, 408 So. 2d 1197
(Miss. 1982) (arrestees in separate patrol cars); State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 701, 286
S.E.2d 102 (1982) (arrestee in patrol car and his two companions under control of
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Justice Brennan also read the majority opinion as allowing the arresting officer to search any locked containers,
such as luggage, found anywhere within the passenger compartment. 115 Justice White, who wrote a separate dissenting
opinion, reached the same conclusion.' 16 It is by no means
clear, however, that the Belton rule extends this far." 7 On
one hand, the Court expressly stated that the police could
search any containers found in the passenger compartment." 8 Yet, despite emphasizing in two places that it is irrelevant whether a particular container is open or closed, the
Court never expressly included a locked container within the
scope of a permissible search." 9 This omission may have
been intentional. A police officer conducting a search of a
motor vehicle incident to the arrest of one of its occupants
can easily determine whether a particular suitcase or other
similar container is locked. If it is locked, then, as a factual
matter, it will almost certainly be outside the immediate control of the arrestee because of the time it would take, and the
difficulty he would have, in attempting to open it in order to
second officer); State v. Reed, 634 S.W.2d 665 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (arrestee in
police cruiser); State v. Hall, 631 S.W.2d 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (arrestee in
police cruiser); Russell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (arrestee
handcuffed and in squad car); State v. Callahan, 31 Wash. App. 710, 644 P.2d 735
(1982) (arrestee in patrol car); State v. Winston, 295 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1982) (arrestee
handcuffed or otherwise secured away from vehicle). But see State v. Zito, 406 So. 2d
167 (La. 1981) (arrestee and her boyfriend handcuffed and in separate police cars;
held: invalid search of vehicle, with no mention of Belton); State v. Rice, 327 N.W.2d
128 (S.D. 1982) (Fosheim, C.J., concurring) (accessibility to passenger compartment is
necessary under Belton).
115. Belton, 453 U.S. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 472 (White, J., dissenting).
117. In Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1982), the court relied upon Belton to
hold that the police could conduct a warrantless search of a locked briefcase the arrestee, a pedestrian, was carrying at the time of his arrest. Apparently only two other
courts have spoken on the issue. In State v. Young, 87 N.J. 132, 432 A.2d 874 (1981),
the police searched a locked suitcase they found on the backseat of the car the defendant had been driving immediately prior to his arrest. Inside they found a woman's
purse which contained two bags of cocaine. The state, however, did not argue that
the search was incident to a custodial arrest, so the court did not decide the validity of
the search under that theory. Nevertheless, it noted that Belton "may apply to these
facts." Id. at 142, 432 A.2d at 879. In Adams v. State, 634 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982), on the other hand, the court, in dicta, stated that Belton authorizes the
police "to search the interior of the automobile and any containers which [are] not
locked." Id. at 789 n.2.
118. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
119. See id. at 460 n.4, 461.
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obtain a weapon or to destroy or conceal evidence. Presumably this is one of the reasons the Court specifically excluded
the trunk of an automobile from its holding in Belton .120 A
rule precluding the warrantless search of such a locked
container, whether it be a suitcase, a briefcase, a footlocker,
or whatever, would thus provide the police with the brightline guidance intended by the Belton Court, without enhancing the danger to the arresting officer while still maintaining
the integrity of any evidence that might be contained
therein.
Justice Brennan raised other questions concerning the
scope of the Belton rule in his dissenting opinion:
[A]ithough the Court concludes that a warrantless search
of a car may take place even though the suspect was arrested outside the car, it does not indicate how long after
the suspect's arrest that search may validly be conducted.
Would a warrantless search incident to arrest be valid if
conducted five minutes after the suspect left his car? Thirty
minutes? Three hours? Does it matter whether the suspect
is standing in close proximity to the car when the search is
conducted? Does it matter whether the police formed
probable cause to arrest before or after the suspect left his
car?

. .

. [A]ssuming today's rule is limited to searches of

the "interior" of cars, what is meant by "interior"? Does it
include locked glove compartments, the interior of door
panels, or the area under the floorboards? Are special rules
necessary for station wagons and hatchbacks, where the
luggage compartment may be reached through the interior,
or taxicabs, where a glass panel might separate the driver's
compartment from the rest of the car? Are the only containers that may be searched those that are large enough to
be "capable of holding another object"? Or does the new
rule apply to any container, even if it "could hold neither a
120. See id. at 461 n.4. Another basis for distinguishing between the interior of
the car and the trunk is that, as a general matter, individuals are more likely to keep
weapons, and perhaps also contraband and fruits of a crime, on their person or with
them in the passenger compartments than to place them in the trunk, and to attempt
to hide those items in the vehicle at the first indication that they are being stopped by
the police. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 431 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(Powell, J., concurring).
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weapon nor evidence of12 the criminal conduct for which the
suspect was arrested"?
Justice Brennan concluded that because Belton left open so
many questions, it did not eliminate the need for case-bycase decision making by the arresting officer - the asserted
goal of the Court's holding. An analysis of the Court's opinion in Belton, however, indicates that these questions, even if
not specifically dealt with by the Court, can be answered
fairly easily, or else will arise so infrequently that their existence will not seriously impair the objective of the Court in
formulating its per se rule.
Consistent with its prior cases dealing with a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, 22 the Belton Court expressly held that the search of the vehicle must be
"contemporaneous" with the arrest. 23 Although the Court
did not define "contemporaneous," it distinguished its earlier decision in UnitedStates v. Chadwick124 on the basis that
the search in that case took place at the local federal building more than an hour after the defendants had been arrested elsewhere and while the defendants were securely in
custody' 25 Chadwick, in turn, relied upon Preston v. United
States, 26 in which the Court held that a search "remote in
time or place from the arrest"'' 27 cannot be considered incidental to that arrest.1 28 This reference to Chadwick thus indicates that there are both temporal and geographical limits
on the authority of law enforcement personnel to conduct
searches under Belton.
One such limitation must be that the police cannot search
the vehicle or an item seized from the vehicle after it has
been removed from the scene of the arrest. In such cases
121. Belton, 453 U.S. at 469-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting majority, 453
U.S. at 460 n.4). Justice Brennan also asked why the majority's rule is necessarily
limited to searches of motor vehicles. Id. at 470 (Brennan J., dissenting). See infra
text accompanying notes 183-95.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216,
220 (1968); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1964).
123. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
124. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
125. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461-62.
126. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
127. Id. at 367.
128. Id. at 367-68.
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there will inevitably be a lapse of time between the arrest
and the search. In addition, as the Court reasoned in Preston, the justifications supporting the rule allowing a search
contemporaneous to an arrest are absent in such situations. 129 Allowing a search in such circumstances would be a
complete break from the rationale of Chimel, something the
Belton Court stated it did not intend.130 Moreover, limiting
the scope of Belton in this way is not inconsistent with the
asserted goal of that decision. A rule requiring the search to
take place at the scene of the arrest still provides bright-line
guidance to the police, since officers contemplating a search
at some location to which the automobile or its contents has
been moved will know that the3 search cannot be justified as
being incidental to the arrest.1 '
Similarly, Belton should not be interpreted to allow the
police to search the automobile or its contents at the scene of
the arrest after the arrestee has been removed from the
scene. Although in this situation there will not necessarily
be a significant interval of time between the arrest and the
129. Id. at 367.
130. The Court stated: "Our holding today does no more than determine the
meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic context. It in no
way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the
basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests." Id. at 460 n.3.
131. Almost all of the lower courts that have considered this issue have interpreted Belton as suggested in the text. See, e.g., United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662
F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant's purse seized at the time of her arrest; both
defendant and purse taken to Immigration Office where purse searched about an hour
after the arrest); United States v. Cleary, 656 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981) (canvas-type
bag seized at time of defendant's arrest; both defendant and bag taken to stationhouse
where bag searched), vacated, 457 U.S. 1113 (1982), on remand, 683 F.2d 313 (9th Cir.
1982); United States v. Farinacci-Garcia, 551 F. Supp. 465 (D.P.R. 1982) (defendant's
briefcase searched by F.B.I. agent as the agent was driving away from arrest scene in
defendant's car, while defendant being driven away in another agent's vehicle; second
search of briefcase in defendant's car after it had been driven to his mother-in-law's
house for safekeeping); People v. Riegler, 127 Cal. App. 3d 317, 179 Cal. Rptr. 530
(198 1) (packages seized from defendant's automobile after he had been removed from
arrest scene searched almost five hours later at stationhouse almost 100 miles away),
vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3564 (1983); State v. Licourt, 417 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (search of defendant's automobile at stationhouse after defendant and car had
been moved there). See also Commonwealth v. Rutigliano, 456 A.2d 654 (Pa. Super.
1983) (search of automobile at stationhouse 35 minutes after arrest cannot be justified
as search incident to arrest; no mention of Belton). Contra Williams v. State, 627
S.W.2d 28 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (search of defendant's automobile and two pillowcases found therein at stationhouse to which defendant and his car had been moved).
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search,132 the arrestee's removal from the scene "foreclos[es]
even the slightest possibility that he could reach for an article within the vehicle."' 133 In addition, stating the rule of Belton with the proviso that the arrestee must be at the scene of
the arrest at the time of the search will not interfere with the
asserted goal of that decision, since police officers in the field
still have a bright-line rule to guide them and they can easily
ascertain whether the arrestee has already been removed
34
from the scene at the time of their contemplated search.
On the other hand, the entire tenor of the Belton opinion
indicates that the Court intended its rule to apply when the
police have arrested the occupant of an automobile and both
the arrestee and the vehicle are still at the scene, regardless
of whether the search takes place one minute, five minutes,
or even thirty minutes after the arrest. Although it can be
persuasively argued that a search conducted longer than this
after the arrest is not "contemporaneous" with the arrest, it
is by no means clear that the Belton Court did not intend to
authorize such searches. Allowing a search whenever both
the vehicle and the arrestee are still on the scene, regardless
of the intervening time period between the arrest and the
search, would serve the Court's purpose of providing clear
guidelines to police officers in the field. An officer who has
arrested the recent occupant of an automobile would not
132. But see United States v. Musick, 534 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (police
did not search defendant's car until one-half hour after defendant had been taken to a
hospital because they had to wait for the animal control unit to remove the defendant's Doberman pinscher from his car).
133. State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982). Of course, if fewer
than all of the arrestees are removed from the scene, this limitation on Belton should
not apply.
134. Some lower courts have interpreted Belton in the way suggested in the text.
See, e.g., United States v. Musick, 534 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (one-half hour
after defendant taken from arrest scene to hospital, the police searched his car and a
briefcase therein; held: search of briefcase was not valid search incident to arrest,
although the search of the vehicle was upheld on the basis of "automobile exception"); State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1981) (search of automobile after
defendant taken from arrest scene not valid search incident to arrest). But see State v.
Nelson, 129 Ariz. 582, 633 P.2d 391 (1981) (search of defendant's car after he had
been taken from the arrest scene to the crime scene for purposes of identification);
People v. Gasteiger, 129 Cal. App. 3d 152, 180 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1982) (search of defendant's vehicle after he had been taken to hospital for medical treatment; result
might be explainable on the ground that there were other suspects at the arrest scene
after the defendant's removal).
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have to determine whether the time that has elapsed since
the arrest was short enough so that a search undertaken then
would be "contemporaneous" with the arrest. Moreover, so
long as both the arrestee and the vehicle are still at the scene
of the arrest, there is at least the theoretical possibility that
the arrestee could free himself from the control of the police
and gain access to a weapon or evidence located within the
passenger compartment of the vehicle. Therefore, such a rule
would still have some relationship to the rationale of
Chimel.15 But even if the Court did not intend this sweeping result, as a practical matter almost all searches conducted under the purported authority of Belton can be
expected to be made within a relatively short period after the
arrest - so short, in fact, that the arresting officer, and subsequently the court, will not even question whether it was
"contemporaneous" to the arrest. 36
As to the types of containers that can be searched, the
Belton Court expressly stated that any object capable of
holding another object is subject to search. 37 The Court
clearly rejected the notion that containers that could hold
"neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for
which the suspect was arrested"'' 38 are exempt from its
rule.'3 9 Belton must therefore be read to apply to all un135. This is arguably true even if the arrestee is handcuffed and in a police car at
the time of the search, and would therefore serve as a basis for distinguishing the
situation in which the arrestee and the vehicle are both still at the scene of the arrest
from the situations, discussed supra text accompanying notes 112-14, when either the
arrestee or the vehicle or its contents has already been removed from the scene.
136. In all of the reported decisions since Belton involving a search conducted at
the scene of the arrest while the arrestee was present, the search apparently took place
almost immediately after the arrest. In none of these cases did the court discuss the
meaning of "contemporaneous."
137. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4.
138. Id. at 461.
139. After stating that any containers found within the passenger compartment
can be searched, the Court remarked:
It is true, of course, that these containers will sometimes be such that they
could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which
the suspect was arrested. However, in United States v. Robinson, the Court
rejected the argument that such a container - there a "crumpled up cigarette
package" - located during a search of Robinson incident to his arrest could
not be searched: "The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence,
does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a
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locked containers
located within the passenger compartment
1 40
of the vehicle.
The remaining questions listed by Justice Brennan as being left "open" can be answered with relative ease by applying the specific rationale underlying Belton and the general
rationale for allowing a warrantless search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. A locked glove compartment or console,
the interior of door panels, the upholstery of the car and the
area under the floorboards should be treated the same way
as any locked luggage or similar containers found inside the
vehicle.14 1 At the outset it must be pointed out that, despite
the opportunity to do so, the Belton Court did not expressly
state that locked compartments located inside the vehicle fall
within the scope of its holding. 142 Additionally, an arrestee
attempting to reach a weapon or evidence located in any of
these areas would not only have to gain access to the automobile, but would also have to unlock the glove compartment or console, rip the upholstery, or dismantle the door or
floorboard. These areas are therefore not readily accessible
even to an arrestee who could gain access to the interior of
the vehicle. In fact, arguably the locked trunk of a car is
more accessible to an arrestee who is outside the vehicle than
any of these areas, yet the Belton Court expressly excluded
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found
upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification."
Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
140. In almost all the lower court cases decided since Belton the container
searched could, in fact, have held either a weapon or evidence of the crime for which
the person was arrested, or both. A rare exception is Daniels v. State, 416 So. 2d 760
(Ala. Crim. App. 1982). There a police officer arrested the defendant for driving
without a license and with an expired vehicle tag. After making the arrest the officer
saw the handle of a pistol sticking out of the console between the front seats. When
he reached for it he found an aspirin bottle on the floor under the driver's seat. He
could not see through the bottle, so he opened it because he was "curious." Inside he
found a controlled substance. In rejecting the defendant's claim that the officer was
not entitled to open the bottle, the court stated: "The Belton rule extends the scope of
searches incident to arrest to include any containers found during the search, regardless of the probability that the container would hold a weapon or evidence." Id. at
764.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
142. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61 & n.4.
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the trunk from its per se rule. 4 3 Also relevant is that drawing the line at areas of the passenger compartment that do
not have to be unlocked, ripped open, or dismantled in order
to be reached by someone with access to the interior of the
vehicle would still provide police officers with a bright-line
rule they can easily apply. 144
This analysis leads to the conclusion that certain areas of
a station wagon, hatchback, or van are encompassed by the
Belton rule. Since the rear deck of a hatchback or station
wagon generally can be reached by someone inside the vehicle, it, as well as any unlocked containers on it, should be
subject to search under Belton .1 4 The same rule should apply to the rear portion of a van if it can be reached from the
143. Id. at 460 n.4. Although it more likely that a weapon or evidence will be
somewhere in the passenger compartment than in the trunk, see supra note 120, it
would be virtually impossible for the occupant of an automobile to conceal a weapon
or evidence inside the upholstery or a door panel or under the floorboard upon realizing he is being stopped by the police. It would also be difficult to place such items in
the glovebox or console andthen lock it before being confronted by the police, since in
many cases the only key to that compartment will be in the ignition, but in any event,
the focus should be on the accessibility of the area once the person is arrested.
144. Police officers conducting a search of the passenger compartment of an automobile could readily determine whether a particular area therein was locked or
needed to be ripped open or dismantled in order to be reached.
Apparently only three lower courts have decided cases involving the search of a
locked glove compartment or console or of a part of the vehicle that first had to be
ripped open or dismantled. Two of these courts upheld the search on the basis of
Belton without any discussion of this issue. See People v. Gasteiger, 129 Cal. App. 3d
152, 180 Cal. Rptr. 704 (!982) (search under loose boards over wheel well in camper
shell of defendant's vehicle); Smith v. United States, 435 A.2d 1066 (D.C. App. 1981)
(per curiam) (search of locked glove compartment), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
The third court apparently concluded that Belton does not authorize the search of a
locked glove compartment. See also People v. Clemmons, 123 Cal. App. 3d 365, 176
Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981).
145. Justice Stevens, who disagreed with the per se rule adopted in Belton, concluded that that rule authorizes the police "to require a driver to open luggage located
in the back of a station wagon ..
" Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 452 n.14
(1981) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The lower courts have reached this result with respect to the rear deck of a
hatchback, sometimes without any discussion of this issue. See United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982); Baxter v. State, 274
Ark. 539, 626 S.W.2d 935 (over dissent which argued that the rear portion of a
hatchback car is not part of the "passenger compartment"), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118
(1982); Alexander v. State, 629 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Cf. People v.
Gasteiger, 129 Cal. App. 3d 152, 180 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1982) (bed of pickup truck covered by camper shell within Belton rule because crawl hole between front compartment and truck bed allowed free access from front to rear without the necessity of
leaving the vehicle).
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passenger compartment.1 46 Areas such as a recessed luggage
compartment or spare tire compartment under the rear deck
of a station wagon or hatchback, if they are not locked and
are subject to opening without any significant degree of dismantling, 147 should also be subject to search, since they are
comparable to a closed but unlocked glove compartment or
console148 - which Belton expressly included within its
49
rule.
Insofar as a taxicab is concerned, that it might have a

glass panel separating the front and rear seats should be irrelevant under Belton. If, as Belton concludes, an arrestee
who is outside an automobile is considered to have access to
the rear seat area of that vehicle, as a matter of law, it should
make no difference150 whether that vehicle has a glass panel
between the seats.
146. See State v. Boswell, 294 S.E.2d 287 (W. Va. 1982). Cf. People v. Gasteiger,
129 Cal. App. 3d 152, 180 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1982) (bed of pickup truck covered by
camper shell accessible from cab through crawl hole).
147. See, for example, Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 422 (1981) (plurality
opinion), discussed infra text accompanying notes 198-99, in which a recessed luggage
compartment could be reached by lifting a handle set flush in the deck of the station
wagon. In Robbins, however, the state did not seek to justify the search as one incident to a lawful custodial arrest. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 429 n.3.
148. Even though each of these areas is the "functional equivalent of a trunk,"
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 447 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., dissenting), their accessibility, not the purpose for which they are used, should be determinative under Belton.
149. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4. If these areas are locked or accessible only
upon significant dismantling, they should be subject to the rule governing locked portions of the passenger compartment. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
Apparently the only court that has dealt with a search of such an area concluded
that the Belton rule does not extend this far. People v. Clemmons, 123 Cal. App. 3d
365, 176 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981) (search of storage compartment in rear of station
wagon). See also United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323, 326-27 (D.C. Cir.) (stating in
dicta that a recessed luggage compartment in the rear of a station wagon does not
constitute part of the "passenger compartment" and therefore is not subject to search
under Belton), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982).
150. It is true, of course, that a person sitting in one area of a taxicab with a glass
partition separating the front and rear seat areas has less access to the other area than
he would in an ordinary automobile. Nevertheless, once outside a vehicle, an arrestee
has the same degree of access to both areas, regardless of whether the vehicle is a
taxicab or an ordinary automobile. Requiring a police officer who has arrested the
driver of a taxicab to assess the probability that the driver has a weapon hidden somewhere in the rear seat area of his vehicle before allowing a search of that area would
be totally inconsistent with the rationale of Belton, as would requiring an officer who
has arrested the passenger of a taxicab to determine whether the passenger and the
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Nor should it matter when the police formed probable
cause to arrest. Since a search incident to an arrest is allowed in order to insure that the arrestee does not grab a
weapon from the area searched or destroy or conceal any
evidence that might be there, it seems totally irrelevant
whether, as in Belton, probable cause to arrest arose while
the arrestee was inside the car or whether it arose after he
exited the vehicle. An arrestee who is outside an automobile
at the time of the search has precisely the same degree of
access to the interior of that vehicle regardless of when the
police acquired probable cause to arrest him. Thus, since
Belton permits a search in the former situation, it logically
must also allow a search in the latter.' 51
Finally, one other question, not raised by Justice Brennan, must be answered in order to determine the precise
scope of the holding in Belton. That question is whether the
Belton rule applies when the police arrest a person who recently occupied an automobile but who was not inside the
vehicle when the police initially came in contact with him. 52
Although in stating its holding in Belton the Court said it is
the "lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile"'153 which triggers its per se rule, the Court stated earlier
in the same paragraph that it was dealing with the issue of
driver were accomplices so that the passenger might know of a weapon or evidence
located in the front seat area.
151. The lower courts have upheld searches on the basis of Belton in both situations without any discussion of the issue. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 435 A.2d
1066 (D.C. 1981) (outside), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); State v. Hopkins, 163
Ga. App. 141, 293 S.E.2d 529 (1982) (inside); Horton v. State, 408 So. 2d 1197 (Miss.
1982) (inside); State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 701, 286 S.E.2d 102 (1982) (outside); Lopez
v. State, 643 P.2d 682 (Wyo. 1982) (inside). Of course, if the arrestee is still inside the
vehicle when the police conduct the search, it is much more likely that the entire
passenger compartment is in fact within his "immediate control." Such a search is
clearly authorized by Belton.
152. The per se rule adopted in Belton applies "when a policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile." Belton, 453 U.S. at 460
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Although the police arrested Belton after he
had exited the vehicle, the Court found its per se rule applicable because Belton "had
been a passenger just before he was arrested." Id. at 462 (emphasis added). It is
therefore clear that when the police stop an automobile and, during the course of that
stop, arrest someone who was in the car at the time of the stop, it is irrelevant under
Belton whether the arrest was made while the person was inside the vehicle or after
he had left it. As indicated supra text accompanying note 151, it should not matter
when probable cause to arrest arose.
153. Id. at 460 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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what constitutes "'the area within the immediate control of
the arrestee' when that area arguably includes the interior of
54
an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant."'1
This phrasing of the issue indicates that the Court intended
its per se rule to apply in some situations in which the police
first encountered the arrestee some time after he left his
vehicle.
But how "recently" must the arrestee have occupied the
automobile to fall within the Belton rule? Given the reasons
for permitting a search incident to arrest,' 55 it follows that it
must be recent enough so that the arrestee is still in the vicinity of the automobile at the time of the arrest. A person who
is stopped by law enforcement personnel moments after he
has exited his automobile and who is placed under arrest
within the immediate vicinity of his car has as much access
to the interior of the automobile as one who, like Belton, was
stopped while in the vehicle, ordered out, and then placed
under arrest while standing near it. 5 6 The same is true even
if a fairly substantial period of time has elapsed since the
arrestee left his car.' 57 Also, since Belton applies even when
the occupant of an automobile is arrested, handcuffed, and
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. See supra text accompanying note 11.

156. Of course, in the former situation it is unlikely the arrestee could have surreptitiously placed a weapon or evidence in his car when he realized the police were
approaching him. Nevertheless, the possibility exists that such items were already in
the car, and requiring police officers to assess the probability of this being true in each
particular case would run counter to the underlying purpose of Belton.
157. In Gauldin v. State, 632 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), applicationfor
writ oferror granted, police officers investigating a robbery that had just been com-

mitted spotted, parked in a parking lot near a nightclub, a red pickup truck matching
the description of one seen leaving the scene of the crime. The officers entered the

nightclub and observed a man who matched the description of the robber sitting
alone at the bar. In response to questions from the officers, the man said he had no
identification and had arrived at the club in a brown Ford LTD automobile. Unsatisified by these responses, the policemen asked the man to accompany them outside

so they could talk to him. Once outside, the officers renewed their inquiry concerning
the vehicle and the suspect admitted having driven to the club in the red pickup truck.
The officers then arrested him and searched the truck, finding money on the seat and

in the glove compartment. The court upheld this search, inter alia, on the basis of
Belton. But see State v. Vanderhorst, 419 So. 2d 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

(search of automobile conducted upon arrest of defendant, but two and one-half
hours after he had been in the vehicle, invalid under Belton, even though defendant
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placed in a squad car, 5 8 it should not matter that the recent
occupant of the vehicle was more than a few feet away from
the automobile at the time he was arrested, so long as59he is
not inside another premises at the time of the arrest.1
In sum, then, the Belton per se rule can be stated as follows: Upon arresting the occupant of a motor vehicle, or
one who recently occupied a vehicle and was still in its vicinity at the time of the arrest, and while the arrestee and the
vehicle and its contents are all at the scene, the police may
search any area in the interior of the vehicle except a locked
compartment or an area that could be reached only by partially dismantling the vehicle, as well as any unlocked containers, whether open or closed, found within any of these
"searchable" areas, regardless of whether they could hold a
weapon or evidence of the crime for which the person was
arrested; such a search is permissible even though the arrestee is already handcuffed or otherwise restrained in some
manner, such as at gunpoint or by being locked in a police
cruiser. With this rule in mind, the reasoning of the Court in
Belton can now be examined.
B.

Critiqueof the Court's Analysis

The Supreme Court adopted the particular per se rule it
did in Belton because it concluded from its reading of lower
court cases that the passenger compartment of an automobile is "generally" within the "immediate control" of an arrestee who recently occupied that vehicle. While it must be
conceded that in a great many factual settings an arrestee
was pushing his vehicle out of the mud at the time of his arrest, because he was not a
"recent occupant" of the automobile).
The Belton Court's citing of United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974), to illustrate the need for a per se rule supports the
argument that it is the arrestee's proximity to the vehicle, rather than the length of
time since he occupied the vehicle, that is most important. For in Frick the police
arrested the defendant as he was about to enter his automobile, which had been
parked overnight. See infra text accompanying notes 185-86.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
159. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court held that the
search of an arrestee's car that is parked in the driveway next to his house cannot be
justified as one incident to an arrest that takes place inside the house. The Belton
Court did not overrule or even discuss Coolidge, thereby indicating it did not intend
its decision to alter that result.
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could indeed reach into the passenger compartment of the
car, and perhaps also into a particular container within that
compartment, there are also a great many common factual
settings in which he could not do so. An analysis of the
cases 60 referred to by the Belton Court makes this clear.
Even when giving the phrase "within the arrestee's immediate control" a broad interpretation, it seems that in at least
two of those cases, Hinkel v. Anchorage16 1 and Ulesky v.
State, 62 the arrestee definitely could not have reached into
the passenger compartment at the time of the search because
the police had already locked her in the rear seat of a squad
car. 63 In addition, the fact that the arrestee in UnitedStates
v. Dixon 164was outside his car and already handcuffed at the
time of the search, and the situation in United States v.
Frick,65 in which five F.B.I. agents arrested the defendant
for fraud as he was about to enter his parked automobile,
seized a briefcase from the rear seat of the car, and searched
it either after the defendant was handcuffed or, at least,
while he was in the process of being handcuffed, indicates
that perhaps two other cases should be added to the list. If
in as many as two, three, or perhaps even four of the eight
cases referred to by the Belton Court the arrestee could not
in fact have gained access to the passenger compartment at
the time of the search, it is probable that the Court incorrectly read "the cases" and erroneously concluded that the
passenger compartment of an automobile is "generally"
within the immediate control of an arrestee who recently occupied that car.
An analysis of the lower court cases decided since Belton
supports this conclusion and also demonstrates the absurd
160. See supra note 76.
161. 618 P.2d 1069 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1032 (1981). See supra
text accompanying notes 81 & 83-85.
162. 379 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). See supra text accompanying
notes 82-83 & 86.
163. Although neither opinion expressly states that the police "locked" the arrestee in the squad car, it is reasonable to assume that upon placing her there they took
steps to assure she stayed put.
164. 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
165. 490 F.2d 666, 672-74 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974). See supra text accompanying
note 95.
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results to which the Belton rule can lead. In a significant
number of cases courts have upheld searches on the basis of
Belton even though the arrestee was sitting in a police
cruiser - in some cases even handcuffed - when the police
searched the passenger compartment of his vehicle or a
container found therein. 166 Courts have reached the same
result in cases in which the arrestee, although not in a squad
car, was either handcuffed or restrained in some other manner by police officers at the time of the search. 167 Yet, in
none of these cases can it realistically be said that the arrestee could have reached into the passenger compartment, or a
container located therein, in order to grab a weapon or to
destroy or conceal evidence. To argue otherwise is to engage
upon a flight of fancy. Furthermore, these are not highly
unusual circumstances. It is quite common for a policeman
to handcuff the arrestee or lock him in a patrol car, or both,
immediately after making a custodial arrest. Nevertheless,
under the holding in Be/ton the entire interior of the automobile, as well as any unlocked containers therein, are conclusively presumed to be within the arrestee's "immediate
control" and therefore subject to a warrantless search in the
absence of probable cause to believe they contain seizable
166. See, e.g., Baxter v. State, 274 Ark. 539, 626 S.W.2d 935 (in police car), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1118 (1982); People v. Henry, 631 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1981) (handcuffed in police vehicle); State v. Valdes, 423 So. 2d 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (in
police cruiser); Chapas v. State, 404 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (in police
vehicle); State v. Hopkins, 163 Ga. App. 141, 293 S.E.2d 529 (1982) (handcuffed in
patrol car); State v. Holden, 162 Ga. App. 33, 290 S.E.2d 130 (1982) (in patrol car);
People v. Loftus, 111 Ill. App. 3d 978, 444 N.E.2d 834 (1983) (handcuffed in squad
car); Horton v. State, 408 So. 2d 1197 (Miss. 1982) (in patrol car); State v. Cooper, 304
N.C. 701, 286 S.E.2d 102 (1982) (in patrol car, two companions under control of second officer); State v. Reed, 634 S.W.2d 665 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (in police
cruiser); State v. Hall, 631 S.W.2d 460 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (in police cruiser);
Russell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (handcuffed in a squad car);
State v. Callahan, 31 Wash. App. 710, 644 P.2d 735 (1982) (in patrol car). Contra
State v. Zito, 406 So. 2d 167 (La. 1981) (handcuffed in police car; no mention of
Belton); People v. Miller, 110 Mich. App. 270, 312 N.W.2d 225 (1981) (per curiam)
(handcuffed in squad car, no mention of Belton), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 809 (1983) (remanded for further consideration in light of Ross and Belton).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 668 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1982); V.I. v.
Rasool, 657 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1981); Thomas v. State, 415 So. 2d 1246 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1982); Fyock v. State, 436 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. 1982); State v. Sanders, 312
N.W.2d 534 (Iowa 1981); State v. Rice, 327 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1982); Campbell v.
State, 644 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), cert. deniedpercuriam, 647 S.W.2d 660
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc); State v. Winston, 295 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1982).
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items. Such a result6 is
totally inconsistent with the Court's
8
rationale in Chimel.'
Of course, the mere fact that some cases might be
"wrongly" decided under a per se rule is not a sufficient reason to refrain from adopting such a rule. If it were, it would
be virtually impossible to adopt a per se rule, even in situations in which one is clearly desirable. 169 But such a rule
should lead to the theoretically "correct" result in the vast
majority of cases. When a per se rule leads to the theoreti-

cally "wrong" result in a significant number of cases, any
benefit to be derived through the ease of its application is

outweighed by its infringement on the rights of individuals.
This is especially true in situations, such as the one under
consideration, in which there are objective factors the police
can rely upon to reach the "correct" result under the facts
and circumstances of the particular case.' 70 Considering the
significant number of cases in which application of the Belton per se rule will lead to the theoretically "wrong" result, it
must be concluded that the Court erred in adopting the rule
it did in Belton.
IV.

ABUSE OF THE PER SE RULE

Perhaps more important that the fact that application of
the Belton rule will quite frequently lead to results that are
inconsistent with the underlying rationale for allowing a
168. Some courts have interpreted Belion to allow the police to search a locked
glove compartment while the arrestee is being restrained by other officers outside the
vehicle, Smith v. United States, 435 A.2d 1066 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950
(1982), to conduct a search even after they have removed the arrestee from the scene.
State v. Nelson, 129 Ariz. 582, 633 P.2d 391 (1981); People v. Gasteiger, 129 Cal. App.
3d 152, 180 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1982), and to search the vehicle or its contents after they
have been taken to some other location. Williams v. State, 627 S.W.2d 28 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1982). As pointed out, supra text accompanying notes 122-34 & 141-44, Belton
should not be interpreted to encompass any of these situations. If, however, the
Supreme Court intended its decision to cover some or all of these situations, the arguments presented in this section of the text become even stronger.
169. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the Supreme Court
adopted a per se rule allowing the police to conduct a full search of the person of an
arrestee incident to his lawful custodial arrest. See supra note 46. Undoubtedly there
will be some cases - perhaps Robinson itself- in which application of this rule will
result in the theoretically "wrong" result. Yet, there are cogent reasons supporting
adoption of a "standardized procedure" to govern such situations. See generaly
LaFave, supra note 42.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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search incident to an arrest, is the fact that the rule is subject
to abuse by police officers. Justice Stevens, in his Robbins v.
Ca/lfornia17 1 dissent, expressed disagreement with the
Court's holding in Belton and pointed out that "[als a matter
of constitutional law . . . any person lawfully arrested for
the pettiest misdemeanor may be temporarily placed in custody."' 7 2 This creates the danger that a police officer who
validly stops a motorist for the sole purpose of issuing a citation for a traffic offense and then sees "an interesting looking
briefcase or package"' 173 in the offender's vehicle may decide
to take the offender into custody, thereby gaining authority
from Belton to search the briefcase or package even though,
had there been a magistrate at his elbow, he could not have
obtained a warrant to search that item because of the absence of probable cause to believe it contained contraband.
The broad rule of constitutional law fashioned by the Court
in Belton therefore potentially applies to the stop of every
traffic offender.
McClanahan v. Superior Court 74 illustrates the problem
to some extent. In McC/anahan a police officer stopped the
petitioner-driver on the basis of an outstanding $150 misdemeanor traffic warrant. Although the officer lacked probable cause to search, he leaned into the rear seat portion of
the vehicle and picked up a bottle. As he did so, it released
weight from a wool hat, exposing a baggie containing cocaine and methamphetamines 7 5 The California Court of
171. 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion).
172. Id. at 450 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). State law, however,
might limit the authority of a police officer to take a traffic offender into custody. See,
e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.727-.728 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
173. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,452 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
174. 139 Cal. App. 3d 31, 188 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1983).
175. The police officer checked for any outstanding warrants after first observing
that the petitioner's car did not have the proper registration sticker. When the officer
subsequently stopped the car the petitioner gave his correct name but could not produce a driver's license. While the petitioner looked in the glove compartment for the
registration papers the officer had requested, the officer used his flashlight to look into
the car for any "alcohol or narcotics or weapons violations." He saw what appeared
to be a six-pack of beer bottles behind the passenger seat. The officer then noticed a
"rather moderate odor of alcohol" about the petitioner's person. The petitioner acknowledged he had been drinking "a little," but only "vaguely shrugged and mumbled and didn't really reply" when the policeman asked him if there was any alcohol
left in the bottles. When the officer took one of the "bottles" from the car, however, it
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Appeal upheld the search on the basis of Belton, even
though the policeman at no time mentioned the outstanding
traffic warrant to the petitioner. The court concluded that
since the officer was authorized by the traffic warrant to
make a custodial arrest, it did not matter that the search actually preceded the formal arrest or that the officer only told
176
the petitioner that he was under arrest for drug offenses.
It is true, of course, that an announcement of a formal
arrest need not precede a search in order for that search to
be a valid search incident to an arrest.17 7 Nevertheless, in
the McClanahan situation, it is worthwhile to ask what the
patrolman would have done had he not discovered the illegal substance in the petitioner's car. Although the officer
had a duty to arrest the petitioner and was authorized to take
him into custody, there is no indication he would have taken
this latter step had the search of the car proved fruitless.
Rather, it is quite possible the officer decided to take the pe178
titioner into custody only after he found the contraband.
Even if the officer in McClanahan would have taken the
petitioner into custody on the basis of the outstanding warrant alone, the possibility remains that many police officers
will decide to take a traffic offender into custody merely as a
pretext to conduct a search under the authority of Belton,
something that the fourth amendment would otherwise prohibit. What makes this danger even more frightening is that
there is probably no remedy for such abuse. Even aside
from the difficulty a defendant would have in attempting to
persuade a court that the arresting officer would not have
taken him into custody in the absence of an "interesting
looking" container in his car, 79 the Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. United States'80 apparently precludes any
consideration of the arresting officer's actual state of mind.
turned out to be a jar, not a beer bottle. Although the officer suspected that the other
"bottles" also were not beer bottles, he picked one up anyway. This led to the discovery of the drugs. The court concluded that this search for the second "bottle" could
not be justified by probable cause. Id. at - 188 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
176. Id. at _ 188 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
177. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980).
178. This is apparently the gist of the dissenting judge's opinion in McClanahan.
See 139 Cal. App. 3d at - 188 Cal. Rptr. at 520 (White, J., dissenting).
179. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 5.2(e), at 284-86.
180. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
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In Scott, the Court held that challenged searches must be
examined "under a standard of objective reasonableness
without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the
officers involved."' 81 Thus, it would seem that as long as a
policeman is authorized to take a traffic offender into custody for the particular violation, it is irrelevant that he decides to exercise that authority only so he can conduct a
search of the offender's car and its contents under the authority of Belton.
V.

APPLICATION OF BELTON TO OTHER SEARCHES

The final problem with New York v. Belton 1 82 is that the
Court's rationale is equally applicable in other contexts involving a custodial arrest. As Justice Brennan asked in his
dissenting opinion in Belton:
[W]hy is the rule announced today necessarily limited to
searches of cars? What if a suspect is seen walking out of a
house where the police, peering in from outside, had
formed probable cause to believe a crime was being committed? Could the police then arrest that suspect and enter
the house to conduct a search incident to arrest?' 8 3
One can imagine numerous variations on this theme. If a
suspect is lawfully arrested inside his home or place of business, could the police conduct a search of the entire room,
including any containers therein, in which they effect the arrest? What about a room which the suspect occupied immediately prior to his arrest? Or what if a suspect is arrested
upon a public street while carrying a briefcase, suitcase, or
dufflebag? Could the police search those items without a
warrant or probable cause after they have completed the arrest and adequately restrained the suspect? Or if a suspect is
arrested as he is approaching his parked automobile, could
the police search the passenger compartment of that car and
any containers therein even if the suspect had not occupied
the vehicle immediately prior to his arrest?
Although the Belton Court purported to restrict its holding to the search of an automobile incident to the custodial
181. Id. at 138 (footnote omitted).
182. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
183. Id. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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arrest of one of its occupants,' 84 the Court's rationale is not
so easily limited. A dresser drawer located across the room
from a handcuffed arrestee who is surrounded by three
armed policemen is no less accessible to that arrestee than
the glove compartment of an automobile is to the recent occupant of that vehicle who is under arrest and locked in the
rear of a police squad car. In addition, it is no less difficult
for the arresting officer to gauge the accessibility of the
dresser drawer to the arrestee in the former situation that it
is to calculate the accessibility of the glove compartment to
the arrestee in the latter. Logically, then, these situations
must be treated the same way.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself arguably has approved
the expansion of Belton beyond the factual setting it
presented. One of the cases cited by the Belton Court to illustrate the confusion among the lower courts in applying
Chimel to a search of an automobile did not involve the arrest of a recent occupant of a motor vehicle. In UnitedStates
v. Frick,185 five F.B.I. agents who had been staking out the
defendant's apartment house arrested the defendant for
fraud as he was on his way to his automobile, which had
been left overnight in the parking lot of his building. While
the defendant stood approximately two feet from his car, apparently being handcuffed, one of the agents seized an attache case from the rear seat of the vehicle, opened it, and
found evidence of the crime. By citing this case to support
the need for a clear-cut rule, the Belton Court apparently
intended its per se rule
to be dispositive of that case in favor
86
of the government.
Several lower courts have gone even further and have relied upon Belton to establish a per se rule allowing the police
to search any container 87 carried by an arrestee at the time
184. 453 U.S. at 460 n.3.
185. 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974).
186. There is no indication that the defendant in Frick had been a "recent occupant" of his automobile.
187. Of the cases cited infra note 188, only Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308 (Fla.
1982), involved a locked container. It is therefore unclear whether the other courts
intended this per se rule to apply to locked containers. The answer to this question
depends, of course, upon whether Belton itself encompasses such containers. See
supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
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of his arrest. 88 These courts have reasoned that Belton "rejected the principle that a search is unlawful with regard to
an object as to which there is no possibility of access by the
arrested person."' 189 For example, in Savoie v. State,1 9° the
court upheld a search of the attache case the defendant had
been carrying, even though the police did not conduct the
sear6h until after they had handcuffed him and taken control
of the case. The same result was reached in Miller v. Superior Court,'9' when the search of a brown paper bag took
place while the defendant was handcuffed and in a squad
car. Given the Court's decision in Belton, it is difficult to
quarrel with the result in these cases. If, as Belton holds, a
closed but unlocked container on the rear seat of an automobile is within the "immediate control" of a recent occupant
of that car who is handcuffed and locked in a patrol car several yards away, it is "illogical and unreasonable"' 92 to conclude that the same container lying on the ground the same
distance from the arrestee would not be within his "immediate control" just because prior to his arrest he was a pedestrian, rather than a motorist. In both cases it would have
188. See, e.g., United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Brown, 671 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Mefford, 658 F.2d
588 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982); Miller v. Superior Court, 127
Cal. App. 3d 494, 179 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981) (holding the search invalid under state
constitution); Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1982); People v. Smith, 89 A.D.2d
549, 452 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1982). See also United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607
(7th Cir. 1982) (upholding search of paper bag the defendant was carrying when arrested, albeit stating that "it is clear that Belton's per se rule is not transferable to all
Chimel searches."). Contra State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982).
This is not to say, however, that all of these cases reached the wrong result. In
several of them the arrestee apparently was not placed in a squad car or handcuffed
prior to the search, United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Brown, 671 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Mefford, 658 F.2d
588 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982); People v. Smith, 89 A.D. 2d
549, 452 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1982), so under the principles of Chimel, as applied to the
specific facts of the particular case, the container might in fact have been within the
arrestee's "immediate control."
189. People v. Smith, 89 A.D.2d 549, 550, 452 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887-88 (1982). See
also United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135, 1146 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Brown, 671 F.2d 585, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Mefford, 658 F.2d 588,
593 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982); Miller v. Superior Court, 127
Cal. App. 3d 494, 502, 179 Cal. Rptr. 783, 788 (1981); Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308,
313 (Fla. 1982).
190. 422 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1982).
191. 127 Cal. App. 3d 494, 179 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981).
192. Savoie, 422 So. 2d at 313.
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been virtually impossible for the arrestee, at the time of the
search, to reach into the container to grab a weapon or to
destroy or conceal evidence. Nor can the cases be distinguished on the ground that it is easier in the latter situation
for the police to determine whether the container can in fact
be reached by the arrestee,93for the difficulty of that decision
is the same in both cases.'
Of course, if these cases are correctly decided, then the
next logical step is to apply the Belton rationale to allow the
police, upon arresting a person inside a house or place of
business, to search the entire room in which the arrest took
place, including any drawers, cabinets, luggage, or other
containers, as well as any rooms which the arrestee occupied
immediately prior to his arrest. This result would take the
law a good deal of the way back to the pre-Chimel days of
United States v. Harris194 and United States v. Rabinowitz 95
and seriously undermine the protections of the fourth
amendment. Although no court has yet gone this far, it
would seem to be only a matter of time before Belton is used
to uphold such a search.
VI.

RATIONALIZING BELTON: ROBBINS v

CALIFORNIA

At this point in the analysis it is appropriate to ask why
96
the Supreme Court reached a result in New York v. Belton 1
that is open to such obvious criticism. Perhaps the most
plausible answer is that the Court decided Belton the way it
did because it could not reach agreement on the related
question of whether the police may conduct a warrantless
193. Even prior to the Court's decision in Belton, many courts seemed to assume

that Chimel authorized a search of any containers being carried by the arrestee at the
time of his arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1975); State v. Lohss, 19 Md. App.
489, 313 A.2d 87 (1973). In theory, however, such a per se rule is wrong, especially in
light of the Court's decision in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See
supra text accompanying notes 24-31. In each case it should be determined, upon the
facts of that particular case, whether, at the time of the search, the container was
within the arrestee's "immediate control." See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 560 F.2d
861 (7th Cir. 1977); State v. Dean, 2 Kan. App. 2d 64, 574 P.2d 572 (1978). See gener-

ally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 5.5(a).
194. 331 U.S. 145 (1947). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
195. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
196. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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search of a container found during the lawful search of an
automobile based upon probable cause to believe the automobile contains seizable items. Yet, the Court wanted to
grant to police fairly broad authority to conduct warrantless
searches of containers found within a motor vehicle. 197 This
answer is suggested by an examination of the Court's treatment of Robbins v. California,'98 a case it decided on the
same day it decided Belton.
Robbins involved facts remarkably similar to those in
Belton. State highway patrolmen who had stopped the defendant for erratic driving smelled marijuana smoke emanating from the defendant's station wagon. Upon searching
the passenger compartment of the vehicle, the officers discovered marijuana and equipment for using it. After placing
the defendant in a squad car, the policemen searched the
rear portion of the station wagon. There they found in a
covered, recessed luggage compartment199 a totebag and two
packages, roughly resembling oversized, extra-long cigar
boxes, which were wrapped in green opaque plastic and
sealed with opaque tape. Acting without a warrant, the officers unwrapped the packages and found 15 pounds of marijuana in each one. The state sought to justify the search of
these packages, not, as in Belton, on the ground that the
search was incident to the defendant's arrest,2°° but rather on
the ground that certain containers, because of their nature,
are not protected by the fourth amendment, so that police
officers who come across such containers while lawfully
searching a motor vehicle on the basis of the so-called "automobile exception" may open them without first obtaining a
search warrant.
Although the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the California Court of Appeals' affirmance of the defendant's conviction,2 ° ' it was unable to muster a majority for
197. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.1, at 180-81, 182.
198. 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion).
199. The Court stated: "[Tihe officers opened the tailgate of the station wagon,
located a handle set flush in the deck, and lifted it up to uncover a recessed luggage
compartment." Id. at 422.
200. See id. at 429 n.3.
201. The defendant was tried and convicted of various drug offenses after the
trial court denied his motion to suppress the marijuana on fourth amendment
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any single analysis of the case. Justice Stewart, writing for
four members of the Court, °2 concluded that police officers
conducting a lawful warrantless search of a motor vehicle
under the so-called "automobile exception" could not open a
closed, opaque container discovered during their search. z 3
In reaching this result the plurality emphasized that the
Court's opinions in Chadwick and Sanders "made clear...
that a closed piece of luggage found in a lawfully searched
car is constitutionally protected to the same extent as are
closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else." 2°4 It rejected
the state's argument that some types of containers, such as
cardboard boxes, paper bags, and the wrapped packages
found in Robbins' car, were entitled to lesser constitutional
protection because they were not commonly used to transport "personal effects. 2 °5

grounds. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion, but the United States Supreme Court vacated that judgment and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). Robbins v. California, 443 U.S. 903 (1979). The California Court of Appeal once again affirmed the conviction. People v. Robbins, 103
Cal. App. 3d 34, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1980), re;"d, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
202. Justices Brennan, White and Marshall joined Justice Stewart's opinion.
203. The plurality noted that the state did not attempt to justify the opening of
the packages as valid searches incident to a lawful custodial arrest or as valid consent
searches. 453 U.S. at 429 n.3.
204. Id. at 425. The government, as amicus curiae, had argued that the fourth
amendment does not fully protect the contents of a closed container carried in an
automobile. Id.
205. Id. at 426. The plurality stated: "By personal effects the [state] means property worn on or carried about the person or having some intimate relation to the
person." Id. at 425.
The plurality rejected the state's argument for two reasons. First, it found there is
no basis in the language or meaning of the fourth amendment for distinguishing between "personal" and "impersonal" effects. Second, it concluded it is almost impossible to perceive any objective criteria by which a distinction based on the nature of the
container could be made, since "[w]hat one person may put in a suitcase, another may
put into a paper bag." Id. at 426.
The plurality also rejected the theory, relied upon by the California Court of Appeal, that the warrantless searches were permissible because "the contents of the packages could have been inferred from their outward appearance, so that [the defendant]
could not have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the contents."
People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 783 (1980). The
California Court of Appeal had relied upon a footnote in Sanders in which the
Supreme Court stated that a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of a container when those contents can be inferred from the outward

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:205

Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment in Robbins but did not write an opinion articulating his reasons for
doing So. 2 0 6 Justice Powell also concurred in the judgment.
Because the parties had not pressed the argument that the
police had probable cause to search the automobile gener20 7
ally, as opposed to probable cause to search the packages,
he analyzed the case under the assumption it was a
appearance of the container. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13
(1979), quoted supra note 35.
The Robbins plurality, however, concluded that the evidence presented by the
state did not sufficiently show that the packages clearly announced their contents. It
explained that the footnote in Sanders dispensed with the need for a warrant when
the contents of the container are in plain view, either because the container is not
closed or because the distinctive configuration of the container or its transparency
proclaims its contents. It then noted that the only evidence relied upon by the California court in applying this exception was the testimony of one of the arresting officers that he had heard that marijuana was normally packaged this way. This, the
plurality concluded, was insufficient to show that "a green plastic wrapping reliably
indicates that a package could only contain marijuana." Robbins, 453 U.S. at 428.
206. Some insight into the Chief Justice's views on the issue may be gained by
examining his opinion concurring in the judgment in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979), in which he stated:
The breadth of the Court's opinion and its repeated references to the "automobile" from which respondent's suitcase was seized at the time of his arrest
.. . might lead the reader to believe - as the dissenters apparently do - that
this case involves the "automobile" exception to the warrant requirement. It
does not. Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage, being transported by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the automobile in which it was being
carried, that was the suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship between the automobile and the contraband was purely coincidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase was resting in the trunk of the automobile at
the time of respondent's arrest does not turn this into an "automobile" exception case. The Court need say no more.
This case simply does not present the question of whether a warrant is
required before opening luggage when the police have probable cause to believe contraband is located somewhere in the vehicle, but when they do not
know whether, for example, it is inside a piece of luggage in the trunk, in the
glove compartment, or concealed in some part of the car's structure. I am not
sure whether that would be a stronger or weaker case for requiring a warrant
to search the suitcase when a warrantless search of the automobile is otherwise
permissible. But it seems to me it would be better to await a case in which the
question must be decided.
Id. at 767-68 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Since Robbins apparently raised the issue the Chief Justice alluded to in Sanders, it is
surprising that he did not take the opportunity in that case to express his views.
207. Justice Poweli also stated that it was too late in the Court's term to reconsider basic doctrine sua sponte. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 435 (Powell, J., concurring).
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"container case," rather than an "automobile case."20 Unlike the plurality, he distinguished between various types of
containers and read the Court's prior container cases, Chadwick and Sanders, as requiring a warrant "only when the
container is one that generally serves as a repository for personal effects or that has been sealed in a manner manifesting
a reasonable expectation that the contents will not be open
to public scrutiny." 20 9 He concluded, however, that Robbins
had manifested such an expectation of privacy in the contents of the packages by carefully wrapping and sealing
them. 210 Despite all of this, Justice Powell expressed sympathy with the dissenters' argument that the searches of the
packages should be upheld on the basis of the "automobile
exception" to the warrant requirement 2 "t and he intimated
he might join them in "[s]ome future case affording an opportunity for more thorough consideration of the basic prin212
ciples at risk.
Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens each wrote
dissenting opinions in Robbins. As indicated above, all three
justices would have upheld the warrantless searches of the
packages on the theory that under the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement, a police officer who has
208. Justice Powell read the plurality's reliance on Chadwick and Sanders as indicating that they, too, viewed the case as a "container case." Id. at 432.
209. Id. Justice Powell felt the plurality's failure to distinguish between various
types of containers would impose significant burdens on the police without any corresponding increase in the protection of an individual's privacy. He stated:
Confronted with a cigarbox or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable-cause
search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientious policeman would be
required to take the object to a magistrate, fill out the appropriate forms, await
the decision, and finally obtain the warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will
be detained while the warrant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer from his normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and
effort, drawn from the public's limited resources for detecting or preventing
crimes, is justified when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests.
In my view, the plurality's requirement cannot be so justified.
Id. at 433. Justice Powell also felt it would not be as difficult as the plurality indicated
to determine whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular
container. Id. at 434 n.3.
210. Justice Powell noted that "[o]ur society's traditional respect for the privacy
of locked or sealed containers confirms the reasonableness of [Robbins'] expectation
[of privacy]." Id.
211. Id. at 435. See infra text accompanying note 213.
212. 453 U.S. at 435-36 (Powell, J., concurring).
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probable cause to believe a motor vehicle contains contraband can search the entire vehicle and any containers found
therein that might reasonably contain the contraband. 3
Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist adhered to the view
that Chadwick and Sanders were wrongly decided,2 14 while
Justice Stevens distinguished those cases on the ground that
neither of21 5them actually involved the "automobile
exception.
The lack of an opinion by the Court in Robbins, and the
different approaches taken by the justices comprising the
majority in favor of reversal, made that case virtually useless
as a guide to police officers in the field. Did it mean that
police officers conducting a lawful search of an automobile
based upon probable cause could not open any containers
discovered during the course of their search? Or did it mean
that they were precluded from opening certain containers,
such as suitcases, briefcases, and well-wrapped packages, but
could open "less worthy" containers, such as paper bags? Or
could they open any container, so long as the probable cause
to search went to the automobile generally, rather than
merely to the container found within that vehicle? Since the
Robbins Court held the warrantless search unlawful and the
plurality opinion dealt with the case as an "automobile
case," there existed a strong possibility that many police officers, to be on the safe side, would read the case broadly to
preclude the opening of any container found during a lawful
search of a motor vehicle under the "automobile exception"
213. 453 U.S. at 436-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 453 U.S. at 441 (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting); 453 U.S. at 444, 447-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. 453 U.S. at 436 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 453 U.S. at 442-43 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun dissented in both Sanders and Chadwick, and was

joined in each of these opinions by Justice Rehnquist. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 768 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 17 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist additionally urged that the exclusionary rule be overruled, 453
U.S. at 437-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and attacked the Court's "judicially created
preference for a warrant as indicating satisfaction of the reasonableness requirement
of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 43 8-39. He also concluded that, in any event, the
contents of the packages found in Robbins' car could be "'inferred from their outward appearance,'" id. at 442 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65
n.13 (1979)), and therefore fell within the exception created by Sanders. Id. at 441-42.

See supra note 35.
215. 453 U.S. at 445-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to the warrant requirement, even when they had generalized
probable cause to search the entire car.21 6 It is arguable,
however, that despite the judgment in Robbins a majority of
the Court did not favor such a result217 and that in order to
avoid it, several justices218 voted in Belton to expand the permissible scope of a search incident to the arrest of an occupant of a motor vehicle, thereby allowing under this theory
warrantless searches of containers in the many cases in
which the police possessed probable cause to search an en-

tire automobile, but in which a broad reading of Robbins
would prohibit the search under the so-called "automobile
exception."
This explanation for the result in Belton becomes even
more plausible when one considers subsequent events.
Barely three months after its decision in Robbins, the Court
granted certiorariin United States v. Ross,2 9 a case involv-

ing the warrantless search of a paper bag found in the trunk

of a vehicle during a lawful search under the so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement.220 Unlike
216. Many courts interpreted Robbins in this way. See, e.g., United States v.
Pillo, 522 F. Supp. 855 (M.D. Pa. 1981); State v. Cooper, 130 Ariz. 348, 636 P.2d 126
(1981); State v. Backner, 413 So. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (airplane); State v.
Bible, 406 So. 2d 138 (La. 1981); State v. Turchik, 53 Or. App. 499, 632 P.2d 497
(1981).
217. Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens made it clear in their dissenting
opinions in Robbins that they did not favor such a result. Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Powell indicated agreement with this view in the subsequent case of United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), in which they joined the Robbins dissenters and
newly-appointed Justice O'Connor in effectively overruling Robbins. See infra text
accompanying notes 219-22. Justice Powell's seemingly inconsistent vote in Robbins
can be explained by his belief that the issue had not been raised in that case. See
supra text accompanying notes 207-12. This reasoning might also explain Chief Justice Burger's seemingly inconsistent vote in Robbins, especially in light of his comments in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 767-68 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring),
quoted supra note 206.
218. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist.
219. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
220. In Ross, a reliable informant told a District of Columbia police officer that
he had just seen an individual known as "Bandit," whom he described in detail, selling narcotics in front of 439 Ridge Street. He also stated that "Bandit" had told him
he had additional narcotics in the trunk of his car. The informant described that
vehicle as a "purplish maroon" Chevrolet Malibu with District of Columbia license
plates. On the basis of this information three police officers drove to the Ridge Street
address and observed such a vehicle. A radio check revealed that the car was registered to Albert Ross, who fit the informant's description and was nicknamed "Bandit." The officers cruised the neighborhood but did not find anyone matching the
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the state in Robbins, however, the government in Ross argued that the search of the container was also valid under
that exception. Exactly eleven months after it decided Robbins, the Court, in a six-to-three decision, upheld the search
of the paper bag in Ross, holding that under the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement a police officer
who has probable cause to search a lawfully stopped vehicle
is authorized to conduct a warrantless search of every part of
that vehicle, including any containers found therein, that
may conceal the object of the search. 22 1 Among the majority
in Ross were Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, both
description of "Bandit." After leaving the area for several minutes, the officers returned and observed the maroon Malibu being driven by a man who matched the
description given by the informant. The officers stopped the automobile and ordered
the driver, Albert Ross, out. One of the policemen searched the passenger compartment of the car, finding a bullet on the front seat and a pistol in the glove compartment. Ross was then arrested, after which one of the officers searched the trunk of the
car. Inside the trunk the officer discovered a closed but unsealed "lunch type" paper
bag and a small leather money pouch which was zippered shut. Upon opening the
bag the policeman found a number of glassine envelopes containing a white powder
which later proved to be heroin. He then drove the automobile to the stationhouse
where he conducted a second warrantless search of the vehicle. During this search he
unzipped the leather pouch and found $3,200 in cash.
Prior to his trial for possession of heroin with intent to distribute, Ross moved to
suppress the heroin and the currency, claiming his fourth amendment rights had been
violated. His motion was denied and he was subsequently convicted. A panel of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that although
the warrantless searches of the car were lawful under the "automobile exception" to
the warrant requirement, the warrantless search of the leather pouch was invalid
under Sanders. The panel, however, upheld the search of the paper bag, distinguishing Sanders on the ground that Ross did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of the bag. On rehearing en banc, a majority of the Court of Appeals
rejected a distinction based on the nature of a container found during a valid automobile search and held that both the warrantless search of the leather pouch and the
warrantless search of the paper bag violated the fourth amendment. United States v.
Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
221. Ross, 456 U.S. at 800 (1982). The Court reasoned that the "automobile exception" must allow the police to conduct a warrantless search of the same scope as
could be authorized by a magistrate on the basis of probable cause justifying the
search and that since a warrant authorizing the search of a vehicle would encompass a
search of any containers found inside the vehicle, police officers acting upon probable
cause, but without a warrant, could search any such container, regardless of its nature. It distinguished Chadwick and Sanders by pointing out that those cases were not
true automobile search cases, since the officers in each of those cases merely possessed
probable cause to search a specific container, rather than the vehicle or anything else
in it. The Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with the holding in
Robbins, but noted that there was no majority opinion or rationale in that case and
that the case was not argued on the basis of the "automobile exception."
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of whom had voted to reverse the judgment in Robbins.2"'
VII.

THE EFFECT OF ROSS ON THE BELTON DECISION

The Court's holding in United States v. Ross22 3 grants
law enforcement personnel significant authority to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles and their contents upon
probable cause, thereby undermining what was perhaps the
true reason for its holding in Belton. Because of this, the
Court should now reconsider its decision in Belton, as it reconsidered its decision in Robbins, and should abolish the
per se rule it adopted in that case and return to the rationale
of Chimel, allowing police officers, upon making a lawful
custodial arrest, to search an automobile and any containers
located therein whenever, under the facts of the particular
case, they are "'within [the arrestee's] immediate control' construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. ' 24 Such a rule would provide adequate guidance to
the police, would adequately protect them and any evidence
that could readily be destroyed or concealed, and would better safeguard the fourth amendment rights of motorists and
their passengers.

222. Justice Stevens, who dissented in both Robbins and Belton, wrote the opinion of the Court. In addition to Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, Justices
Blackmun, Rehnquist and O'Connor, who had been appointed to replace the retired
Justice Stewart, joined the Court's opinion.
223. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
224. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (footnote omitted).

